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Issues in Commercial Banking 
Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
Commercial banking is a very difficult service industry in which to measure 
output, technical change, or productivity growth. First, there is disagreement 
over which services banks produce and over how to measure them. In addi- 
tion, banking services are often priced implicitly through below-market inter- 
est rates  on  deposit  balances,  making  observed  revenue  flows  inaccurate 
guides to choosing the important outputs to include in the analysis. Banking 
also remains  a highly  regulated  industry  in which  substantial inefficiencies 
have been shown to exist. As a result, technical  improvements that increase 
the productivity of the most efficient firms may not be well reflected  in the 
industry as a whole. A further complication is that the deposit side of banking 
underwent substantial deregulation in the 1980s, including the lifting of effec- 
tive interest rate ceilings on certain deposits and the creation of new types of 
accounts. The deregulation directly raised banking costs and shifted the opti- 
mal mix between the provision of services and the payment of  interest to de- 
positors. Measurement of cost changes and productivity gains must take these 
factors into account, including the possibility  of  a period  of  significant dis- 
equilibrium as banks attempted to adjust to deposit deregulation. 
Despite these difficulties, it is important to analyze the banking industry, as 
it constitutes almost 20 percent of the U.S. finance, insurance, and real estate 
service sector of the national income accounts (net of owner-occupied hous- 
ing). In addition, the externalities that banking generates through its roles as 
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the nation’s primary  financial intermediary and conduit for monetary  policy 
are considered to be important enough to require substantial government pro- 
tection  and  supervision.  Correspondingly,  this  paper  attempts  to  meet  the 
challenges mentioned above in measuring output and efficiency in U.S.  bank- 
ing in the 1980s. It is hoped that some of the methods used here will also be 
applicable to the study of other service sectors. 
Section 7.1 analyzes some of the problems in defining and measuring bank 
output. Three methods of choosing which banking functions represent impor- 
tant outputs are evaluated: the asset, user cost, and value-added approaches. 
The value-added  approach, which identifies the major categories of deposits 
and loans as the important bank outputs, is determined to be the most satisfac- 
tory  for our purposes.  Note that, although deposits are specified as outputs 
because of their associated service output to depositors, we also specify them 
as having input characteristics,  since they provide much of the supply of funds 
to be invested in creating loan output. 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3  examine inefficiency and technical change in banking. 
The striking degree  of cost dispersion  in banking,  where  some firms have 
average costs several times higher than others with similar scale and product 
mix,  suggests  that  the  standard  assumption  of  equal  efficiency underlying 
most analyses of technical change is invalid for banking. Cost function studies 
of technical change (e.g., Hunter and Timme 1986) or productivity measures 
that relate total industry output to inputs (e.g., the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
[BLS] labor productivity measure) may confuse changes in the minimum cost 
technology with changes in the deviations from that technology  (i.e., ineffi- 
ciency). We separate these elements here by estimating the change over time 
in both a cost frontier and the dispersion of  industry costs from the frontier. 
Three methods of estimating  a frontier are analyzed,  and the  thick-frontier 
method is chosen as most appropriate for the highly dispersed banking data. 
This method is applied to all 14,000 U.S. banks for the years 1980, 1984, and 
1988,  which  roughly  correspond  to  periods  of  pre-,  mid-,  and  post- 
deregulation of the deposit  side of banking,  respectively.  Shifts in the cost 
frontier over time are used to examine the effects of deregulation and technical 
change. Changes over time in the dispersion from the frontier are also evalu- 
ated. In this way,  the standard approach to measuring productivity change is 
decomposed  into two parts:  the  frontier  shift and the change  in dispersion 
from the frontier.  It is found that the interest rate deregulation of the  1980s 
and the banking industry’s response to it on balance increased costs in bank- 
ing, but much of this increase benefited bank depositors through higher inter- 
est payments  without  a corresponding  decrease  in the provision  of  deposit 
services. 
7.1  Defining and Measuring Bank Output 
There is long-standing disagreement over exactly what it is that banks pro- 
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the asset, user cost, and value-added approaches. It is argued that the value- 
added approach, which defines outputs as those activities that have substantial 
value added (i.e., large expenditures on labor and physical capital), is best for 
accurately estimating changes in bank technology and efficiency over time. 
7.1.1 
Virtually all observers would agree that bank liabilities have some charac- 
teristics of inputs, because they provide the raw material of  investable funds, 
and that bank assets have some characteristics of outputs as they are ultimate 
uses of  funds that  generate the bulk of  the direct  revenue that banks  earn. 
Under the asset approach, banks are considered only as financial intermedi- 
aries between liability holders and those who receive bank funds. Loans and 
other assets are considered  to be bank outputs; deposits and other liabilities 
are inputs to the intermediation process (see Sealey and Lindley  1977). For 
some large banks that primarily purchase their funds (with interest payments) 
from other banks and large depositors and turn these funds into loans, this is 
an adequate description of bank output. However, most banks do much more 
than purchase their funds-they  also provide substantial services to deposi- 
tors, but these services are not counted as output in the asset approach. 
Mamalakis (1987) makes the useful distinction between the funds interme- 
diation and deposit services of banks, of which the asset approach considers 
only  the former.  Intermediation  services  transform  balance-sheet  liabilities 
into assets and pay out and receive interest to cover the time value of the funds 
used in this capacity.  Although  some large banks tend to specialize in this 
function, most banks raise  a substantial portion  of their funds through pro- 
duced deposits and provide liquidity, payments, and safekeeping services (as 
well as interest payments) to depositors to obtain these funds. 
For some purposes, the asset  approach  is the most  appropriate.  For in- 
stance, in a study of loan costs or profitability, a reduced-form model in which 
the costs and different methods of raising  funds are taken to be exogenous 
may be best. However, any study of banking output as a whole needs to con- 
sider a structural form in which the investable funds are an intermediate out- 
put of raising deposits, and the services are provided to depositors as partial 
payment to obtain these funds. The reduced-form asset approach excludes the 
important differences in service output that occur when the funds are raised 
via produced deposits versus purchased funds. Moreover, under current insti- 
tutional arrangements, application of the asset approach to measure banking 
output often leads to contradictions.  For example, consider a bank that pro- 
duces deposits and sells virtually all its funds to a second bank, which makes 
commercial loans with these funds. If the two banks merge, there is no change 
in total banking output, ceteris paribus. However, under the asset approach, if 
both commercial and interbank loans are considered to be outputs, then mea- 
sured output would be diminished by the merger because there would be no 
more interbank lending. If only commercial loans are considered to be out- 
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puts, then the bank that sells funds has no measured output, despite its pro- 
duction of deposit services and the fact that the second bank values the funds 
purchased. 
7.1.2  The User Cost Approach 
The user cost approach determines whether a financial product is an input 
or an output on the basis of its net contribution to bank revenue. If the finan- 
cial returns on an asset exceed the opportunity cost of funds or if the financial 
costs of  a liability are less than the opportunity  cost, then the instrument  is 
considered to be an financial output. Otherwise, it is considered to be a finan- 
cial  input.  Hancock (1985a,  1985b) first applied  the user cost  approach  to 
banking and Fixler and Zieschang (1990; chap. 6, this vol.) used it to deter- 
mine the weights applied to bank  asset and liability categories  to derive in- 
dexes of bank output and prices.' 
The user cost approach determines whether an asset or liability category 
contributes to the financial output of a bank. The operating costs involved in 
producing  nonfinancial services associated  with the asset or liability are not 
explicitly considered. However, under relatively standard assumptions, these 
operating costs (inclusive of  a normal return on capital) are simply the dual of 
the user cost approach and are included implicitly. An optimizing bank earns 
(in financial revenue less operating costs) exactly its opportunity cost of funds 
at the margin on each asset and pays (in financial costs plus operating costs) 
exactly its opportunity cost at the margin on every liability.* Thus, to the ex- 
tent that the user cost approach accurately measures marginal financial reve- 
nues and opportunity costs, its allocation is largely on the basis of  excluded 
operating costs, which is almost the same as the basis of the value-added ap- 
proach  described  below.  However,  there  are some difficulties  in measuring 
financial revenues and marginal opportunity costs that make the user cost ap- 
proach to distinguishing outputs from inputs subject to significant measure- 
ment error and sensitive to changes in the data over time. 
A problem with measuring the financial flows associated with balance-sheet 
items, particularly loans and demand deposits, is that there is some commin- 
gling of  implicit revenues  that cannot be easily  disentangled.  As discussed 
further below,  banks  frequently  use compensating  balances  or pay  below- 
market rates on deposits as a method of charging for bank services. Borrowers 
are often required to hold part of their loan funds as idle demand deposit bal- 
ances, which means that some of a bank's  earnings on a loan are implicit and 
1. The user cost approach was pioneered by Donovan (1978) and Bamett (1980) in developing 
money supply indexes. 
2. The underlying assumptions used here are fairly common in banking. If costs and revenues 
are separable across asset and liability categories and a bank holds securities that it perceives to be 
in  infinite supply (e.g.,  Treasury Bills),  then the quantities of  asset and liability categories are 
adjusted until the marginal revenue less operating cost on every asset and the marginal revenue 
paid plus operating cost on every liability equal the security rate less its marginal operating cost. 
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are earned by paying less than the opportunity cost of funds on deposits. Fur- 
ther implicit earnings accrue to the bank on a loan when additional balances 
are kept with the bank  for liquidity, clearing, or timing purposes associated 
with spending the loan receipts. If the ratio of the compensating and conjunc- 
tive balances to loans were known, the implicit earnings could be allocated to 
loans in much the same way that the implicit losses on deposits from reserve 
requirements are calculated. However, this ratio is not known or estimated and 
these implicit revenues are instead allocated entirely to deposits. As a result, 
there is a bias toward finding loans to be inputs or to have a smaller output 
weight and toward finding demand deposits (where the balances are held) to 
be an output or to have a higher output weight. 
Another difficulty is in adjusting opportunity costs for the important char- 
acteristics of  bank  assets and liabilities,  including differences in credit risk, 
liquidity,  and duration  (maturity).  Banks earn substantially higher  rates for 
riskier, less liquid, and longer-term assets and pay substantially higher rates 
for deposits and other liabilities that are uninsured, have fewer liquidity fea- 
tures, and have longer terms to maturity. Theory requires that each dollar of 
bank liabilities or assets have the same marginal opportunity cost only after 
adjustment for these important characteristics. Therefore, the opportunity cost 
must be adjusted for each category or, equivalently, the financial return or cost 
of  each category  must  be  adjusted  before  applying a common  opportunity 
cost.3 In practice, these adjustments are difficult to make for every category, 
although there have been some attempts to do  SO.^ When such adjustments are 
not  made or fall  short,  the  determination  of  outputs  from  inputs  and  the 
weights derived for an index of bank output is biased. The bias toward finding 
an asset to be an output or have a higher output weight is greater, the longer 
the maturity, the less the liquidity, and the greater the credit risk, because these 
characteristics increase the unadjusted rate earned on an asset but are not re- 
flected in the opportunity cost as currently mea~ured.~  Thus, the matching of 
liability and asset durations to reduce interest rate risk, the holding of  assets 
and liabilities with varying liquidity features,  and the making of  loans with 
different credit risks are all commonplace  in banking but  may  not be well 
reflected in the application of the user cost approach. 
A final difficulty is the apparent sensitivity for turning outputs into inputs 
and vice versa with  slight changes in the data or assumptions.  When Fixler 
and Zieschang  (1990) switch the  assumed opportunity cost  for all balance- 
3. As well, ex ante rates  and opportunity costs are called for,  but only ex post values are 
observed. 
4.  E.g., Hancock (1985a.  198%) corrected for credit risks on loans by subtracting off histori- 
cal average loan losses for each bank. Also, Fixler and Zieschang (chap. 6, this vol.) calculated 
opportunity costs that differ by bank, which may be viewed as a rough method of  accounting for 
differences in risk, liquidity, and duration across institutions. 
5. The biases go in the opposite direction for liabilities, because banks pay  higher rates on 
longer maturity, less liquid,  or  riskier  liabilities,  and these higher rates are subtracted from a 
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sheet items between  the  average  interest rate on loans (the Bureau  of  Eco- 
nomic Analysis [BEA] method) and the average of interest rates on both loans 
and deposits (the United Nations Statistical Office [UNSO] method), a num- 
ber of  switches in sign of  user cost occur.6 In  addition, nearly half  of  their 
financial categories (mostly the smaller categories) switch between inputs and 
outputs over a five-year period, even without changing the method of comput- 
ing opportunity cost. One would expect banking technology  to remain suffi- 
ciently  constant  that  the  determination  of  inputs  and  outputs  should  not 
change so often. 
7.1.3  The Value-Added Approach 
The value-added  approach differs from the asset and user cost approaches 
in that it considers all liability and asset categories to have some output char- 
acteristics rather than distinguishing inputs from outputs in a mutually exclu- 
sive way.  The categories having substantial value added, as judged using an 
external source of operating cost allocations,  are employed as the important 
outputs. Others are treated as representing mainly either unimportant outputs, 
intermediate products,  or  inputs, depending on the specifics of the category. 
A significant difference from the user cost approach is that the value-added 
approach  explicitly  uses  operating  cost data  rather than  determining  these 
costs implicitly  as that part  of  the return  or cost not  accounted for by  the 
difference between measured financial flows and marginal opportunity costs. 
The application of  the value-added  approach here and in other recent cost 
studies of the banking industry (e.g., Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987) 
identifies the major categories of  produced deposits (demand, time and sav- 
ings) and loans (real estate, commercial,  installment) as important outputs, 
because they are responsible for the great majority of value added. Purchased 
funds (federal funds purchased,  large CDs, foreign deposits, other liabilities 
for borrowed money) are treated as financial inputs to the intermediation pro- 
cess, because they require very small amounts of physical  inputs (labor and 
capital).  On the asset side, government securities and other nonloan  invest- 
ments are considered  to be unimportant outputs, because their value added 
requirements are also very low.’ 
Table 7.1 shows the distribution of expenses for labor (salaries and fringe 
benefits) and capital (occupancy and furniture and equipment expenses) for 
the largest size class of banks reported  in the Federal Reserve’s Functional 
Cost Analysis (FCA) program for 1980, 1984, and  1988.* In 1988, the two 
6.  Fixler and Zieschang (chap. 6, this vol.) using a distance function approach, estimate op- 
portunity costs that differ noticeably from the BEA and UNSO opportunity costs. However, the 
output and price indexes formed using the different opportunity costs were not very sensitive to 
these differences. 
7. Government securities also often play an input role when they serve as required collateral 
on government deposits. 
8. The FCA is a cost-allocationiaccounting system that assigns direct and joint costs to a num- 
ber of banking functions based on expert information and accounting rules of thumb. The FCA 
sample includes about 400-600  banks each year and is inclusive of  all bank  sizes except the 
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Table 7.1  Distribution of Bank Value Added in 1980, 1984, and 1988 (%) 
Deposits  Loans 
Demand  Time &  Real  Commercial 
Year  Deposits  Savings  Estate  & Industrial  Installment  Total 
1980  37  10  3  11  10  71 
1984  31  14  4  13  12  80 
1988  36  12  4  14  12  78 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FCA data. 
Note:  Data refer to banks with $200 million to $1 billion in deposits, the largest-size class in the 
FCA data. 
major deposit functions shown absorbed 48 percent of bank value added; three 
major loan functions absorbed 30 percent, for a total of 78 per~ent.~  Similar 
results are shown for the two earlier periods.’O 
The outputs  identified using  value  added are similar to those used  in the 
BLS measure of bank labor productivity,  which uses a set of aggregate trans- 
action flow data on major deposit and loan services, such as the number of 
checks written for demand deposits, the number of savings deposits and with- 
drawals for time and savings accounts, and the number of new loans for real 
estate, commercial, and installment  loans (BLS 1989). Unfortunately,  these 
flow data are not available for all banks. In the analysis below, the deflated 
values of deposit and loan balances are used as outputs for individual banks. 
The presumption  is that  these  real dollar balances  are proportionate  to the 
underlying transactions and account maintenance service flows for the deposit 
categories  and  the  transactions, credit  evaluation,  and  monitoring  service 
flows for the loan categories.II  Note that, although real deposit balances are 
used  to  indicate  bank  service  output, the  interest  costs on these  deposits, 
which are associated with the role of deposits as providing the input of  loan- 
able funds, are specified as well. In the existing literature, deposits are gener- 
ally treated as either an input or an output, but both characteristics are repre- 
sented here.  I2 
Despite the differences between the value-added and user cost approaches, 
the two methods do give similar results, in at least  some cases. When we 
9. Other bank functions, in declining order of importance, are trust (8 percent), credit cards (5 
percent), and other data services (4 percent). The remaining 5 percent includes nonbanking activ- 
ities (e.g., insurance), nondeposit funds, and safe deposit. 
10.  If the FCA data were not available, the value-added approach could be essentially repli- 
cated for any sample of  banks by  applying a statistical cost function to call report data. The 
coefficients of  a regression of  labor and capital expenses on the dollar volumes of  assets and 
liabilities can substitute for the percentage of value added to determine the important bank outputs 
and their weights in an output index. 
11. In support of this presumption, Humphrey (1992) showed that a cost-share weighted aver- 
age of the deflated deposit and loan balances used here yields approximately the same growth rate 
as does the BLS index of bank transactions for the 1980s. 
12.  Comments by Frank Wykoff and Jack Triplett have helped us clarify our position on this 
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apply our value-added weights to the same group of banks for the same time 
period (1984-88)  as in Fixler and Zieschang (chap. 6, this vol.), we obtain a 
7.6 percent annual growth rate, similar to their rate of about 8.8 percent. 
7.1.4  Implicit Revenues versus Explicit Revenues in Banking 
Much of  the disagreement surrounding the choice of bank outputs can be 
traced  to the  fact  that  bank  services  are not  priced  in  the  same manner as 
services provided  by  other industries.  In many cases, the pricing is implicit 
for institutional and regulatory reasons.'? On the loan side, most of the reve- 
nue is explicit interest and fees. However, as discussed above, some implicit 
revenue is raised by  business borrowers holding additional idle demand bal- 
ances with  the bank. On  the deposit  side, revenues from the compensating 
component of deposit balances, defined as the bank's earnings owing to pay- 
ment of below-market  interest rates, dominate explicit revenues. l4 As shown 
below, these implicit  revenues currently  account for over 80 percent  of  the 
revenue raised on deposits, although an unknown (but small) part of  this fig- 
ure is implicit revenue for loans. 
This suggests that in banking, unlike other industries, explicit revenues are 
an unreliable guide to determining outputs or service  flows.  If  banks  paid 
market rates on all deposits and charged explicit fees for all deposit services, 
then this large explicit revenue flow would be convincing evidence that depos- 
its provide substantial service output. Thus, much of  the controversy regard- 
ing the treatment of deposits as an input or an output arises because the ex- 
plicit revenues on deposits are relatively small. Another problem with the use 
of revenue data is that the proportion of revenue that is explicit is not constant. 
The deregulation of  bank deposits caused a significant increase over the 1980s 
in the proportion of  revenues that were explicit, from 5 percent in 1980 to  11 
percent in 1984 to 18 percent in 1988. 
Table 7.2 illustrates these points, showing estimated breakdowns of deposit 
revenues  and costs for  1988. The implicit revenue from deposit balances is 
computed as follows: 
(1)  Implicit revenue = (1 -  r,/r,,)[balance,  . (1 -  RR,)]  r,, 
where r, = the average interest rate paid on balance j;  rFF  = the federal funds 
rate (a market rate); balance,  = the value of thejth deposit balance; RR,  = the 
13. E.g., idle deposit balances for loan borrowers are negotiated on a case-by-case basis and 
provide a way to adjust the loan price without altering a very visible and comparable interest rate. 
For depositors, regulation forbids interest on demand deposits and formerly put ceilings on other 
deposit rates as well. The use of indirect pricing, such as minimum balance requirements at below 
market interest rates, also makes comparison shopping difficult. 
14.  A below-market interest rate on a deposit is equivalent to a zero-rate compensating balance 
on part of the deposits and a market rate on the remainder. E.g., if the actual rate paid is two- 
thirds of  the market rate, then the implied zero-rate compensating balance is one-third of the total 
deposit balance. For a demand deposit, which has a zero interest rate, the entire balance is com- 
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Table 7.2  Deposit Revenues and Costs for All U.S. Banks, 1988 
Source of Revenues and Costs 
Value (in billions 
of  1988 dollars) 
Revenues: 
Value of  compensating balances (implicit revenues) 
Demand deposits 
Time & savings deposits 
Other deposits 
Total implicit revenues 
Total deposit revenue 
Explicit revenues from fees on deposits 
Allocated operating costs: 
Demand deposits 
Time & savings deposits 
Other deposits 
Total operating costs allocated to deposits 
26.7 
14.5 







5.5  - 
47.4 
Source: Revenues are calculated from the call report and costs are allocated from the FCA data. 
See Berger and Humphrey (1990, appendix table AIA) for more details. 
reserve requirement on balance j;  and rTB  = the 90-day Treasury Bill rate, a 
standard-earnings credit rate applied to compensating balances. The first term 
in (1) compares the rate paid on deposits (r,)  with the market rate (rFF)  and 
determines the proportion of balance, that is purely compensating. This com- 
pensating component is then adjusted for nonearning required reserves (1 - 
RR,)  and evaluated using a standard earnings credit rate (rTB),  giving the im- 
plicit revenue flow. The top half of table 7.2 shows the estimated implicit and 
explicit revenues for deposits for all banks in the United States in  1988. Im- 
plicit revenues ($41.9 billion) account for 82 percent of  the $5 1.3 billion in 
total deposit revenues. About two-thirds of the implicit revenue is generated 
from demand deposits; one-third is generated by  time and savings deposits. 
The bottom  half of the table shows the allocation  of  operating costs to the 
deposit categories  using  ratios  of  FCA costs for that year. The overall  cost 
estimate of $47.4 billion is just a little below the estimated revenues of  $5 1.3 
billion.  Note  that the  slightly higher revenues  than  costs may  be  expected 
because some of the revenues from demand deposits are actually implicit rev- 
enues on loans. 
Two final conclusions  are suggested by  these data: First, the finding of  a 
large amount of total (implicit plus explicit) revenue on both demand deposits 
and time and savings deposits supports the finding under the value-added ap- 
proach that both types of deposits have output characteristics. Under the asset 
approach, neither of  the deposit types is an output, and under the user cost 
approach as applied to date, usually only demand deposits are outputs.1s Sec- 
15.  An exception is Fixler and Zieschang (chap. 6, this vol.),  who do not distinguish among 
deposit categories,  but rather include all deposits and  some other purchased funds in a single 
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ond, if one uses procedures applied to other industries to measure gross output 
in banking-namely,  looking only at the explicit revenue flows-then  deposit 
output is understated by about 80 percent. Moreover, the shifts over time from 
implicit to explicit pricing can give the false impression that the level of bank 
output  is increasing, even  if  total revenues  (implicit plus explicit) and total 
output may not have changed. 
7.2  Inefficiency and Cost Dispersion in Banking 
If all banks are approximately equally efficient, as is assumed in most bank 
cost studies, then it is appropriate to examine technical change and productiv- 
ity growth over time using the data from either all banks or from a represent- 
ative sample. However,  if banks are not close to being equally efficient, then 
cost function  measures  of  technical  change, such as in  Hunter  and Timme 
(1986), or measures of  average productivity  change, such as the BLS labor 
productivity index, may confuse shifts in the minimum-cost technology with 
changes in the dispersion of bank costs away from the minimum-cost technol- 
ogy. We try to separate these elements by forming a thick-frontier cost func- 
tion for relatively low-cost banks. In this section, we examine inefficiency and 
cost dispersion away from this frontier; in the following section, we examine 
changes in this frontier over time. 
Banking costs show a striking degree of  dispersion. In many cases, banks 
have costs that are several times higher than other banks with similar scale and 
product  mix. This cost dispersion  could be due to many  factors, including 
simple inefficiency. Here, we estimate a thick-frontier cost function using data 
from banks in the lowest average cost quartile, compare it to a cost function 
for banks in the highest average cost quartile, and then decompose the differ- 
ence. The residual  that cannot be explained  with the  available  variables is 
assumed to be a reasonable representation of inefficiency. Some evidence cited 
below supports this view, specifically (1) high-cost  banks experienced much 
greater failure rates than low-cost banks, (2) the set of banks that were low 
cost were stable over 1980-88,  and (3) low-cost banks consistently had the 
highest profits. 
7.2.1  Cost Dispersion in Banking 
Figure 7.1 shows for banks in branching and unit banking states the varia- 
tion in average operating plus interest cost per dollar of assets by bank size 
class for  1988.16 AC,,,  shows the  minimum cost  per  dollar intermediated; 
AC,,,  AC,,,  and AC,,,,  are the average costs for the low-cost quartile, high- 
cost quartile, and overall mean, respectively.”  The sample was divided into 
16.  Branching and unit banking states are treated separately here (as in other studies) because 
17.  There were too few large banks in unit states in 1988 to form quartiles for the top two size 
of the significantly different regulatory and competitive environments. 
classes, so only the mean is shown for these classes in figure 7.1B. 255  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
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.ll  \  - 
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size classes prior to forming the cost quartiles to ensure reasonable represen- 
tation of all sizes of banks across quartiles and to limit the problem of dividing 
up the quartiles on the basis of a function of the dependent variables in the 
cost regressions below. For both branching and unit states, the data show large 
variations  in average costs between the lowest-cost  quartile (AC,,)  and the 
highest-cost quartile  (AC,,)  for banks within the same size class where size 
and product mix variations  are relatively  small. To  illustrate how important 
this dispersion is in light of the highly leveraged nature of banking, consider 
a typical bank, which has a 6 percent capitaliasset ratio, earns 1 cent per dollar 
of assets, and has a return  on equity (ROE) of  16.7 percent. An increase in 
costs of 3 cents, the typical difference between AC,,  and AC,,,  will result in 
an ROE of  -33.3  percent  and  wipe out equity capital in  3 years,  all else 
equal. 
The marked cost dispersion also appears to dominate the relatively small- 
scale and product mix economies in banking. For the 10,961 banks in branch- 
ing states, the costs for the highest-cost quartile (Q4) are 36 percent higher on 
average than for the lowest (Ql); the maximum difference in costs across size 
classes (taken from the ACME*,  curve) is only  10 percent.Is The size of these 
cost differentials strongly suggests that banks are not close to equally efficient, 
as is assumed in conventional banking studies. 
7.2.2 
With the exception of engineering-based analyses, production technologies 
are essentially unknown. As a result, inefficiencies must be measured relative 
to some cost or production “frontier” that is estimated from the data. Accord- 
ingly, measures of inefficiency reflect deviations of costs or input usage away 
from some minimal  levels found in the data, rather than a true technology- 
based minimum. The difference among techniques found in the efficiency lit- 
erature largely reflect differing maintained assumptions involved in estimating 
the location of the efficient or best-practice frontier. 
The major difficulty in estimating a frontier cost or production function is 
in disentangling inefficiencies from random measurement error and luck. The 
econometric approach (e.g., Ferrier and Love11 1990) estimates a frontier cost 
function where the (composed) error term includes both inefficiency and ran- 
dom error, which  are assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors.  The two 
components are separated by assuming that the inefficiencies are drawn from 
a half-normal  distribution  and the  random errors are drawn from a normal 
distribution. Unfortunately, the location of the frontier is highly dependent on 
the actual shapes of the two distributions.  As pointed out by  Greene (1990) 
and Stevenson (1980), the half normal is rather inflexible and embodies an 
assumption  that  most  observations  are  clustered  near  full  efficiency, with 
Frontier Approaches to Measuring Inefficiency 
18. For the  1,844 banks in unit states, Q4 costs are 30 percent higher on average than Ql;  the 
maximum difference across size classes is 20 percent. 257  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
higher degrees of inefficiency being decreasingly likely. This runs counter to 
the observed bank cost data (fig. 7. l), which suggest a relatively thick-tailed, 
unskewed distribution of costs. 
The data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach (e.g., Aly, Grabowski, Pa- 
surka,  and Rangan  1990) avoids distributional assumptions by  using linear 
programming techniques to estimate frontiers that connect the input require- 
ments of the efficient firms. Unfortunately,  it does so through the ad hoc as- 
sumption that  there  is  no random  error-all  variation  not  in  the  inputs  is 
treated as reflecting inefficiency. If random error does exist, it can have a large 
cumulative  effect  on aggregate  inefficiency  because  this  measure  is deter- 
mined by comparing the few fully efficient firms on the frontier with all other 
firms not on the frontier. As indicated in figure 7.1, the lowest-cost observa- 
tions (AC,,,)  have costs far below both the mean (ACMEAN)  and the average of 
the lowest-cost quartile (AC,,),  indicating that a substantial degree of random 
error may be present. 
This paper views the  measurement  of  inefficiencies from a different per- 
spective and uses a set of ad hoc assumptions that are somewhat more intuitive 
and better justified by our data. Instead of trying to estimate a precise cost or 
production frontier edge, we estimate a “thick-frontier’’ cost function for the 
lowest average cost quartile of banks, where it may be reasonably assumed 
that banks are of greater than average efficiency. A cost function is also esti- 
mated  for the highest-cost  quartile, in which banks are presumably  of  less 
than average efficiency. Differences between these two cost functions are then 
divided between market factors (e.g., scale, product mix, branches) that are 
not easily attributable to inefficiency, and a residual, which we assume reason- 
ably represents inefficiency. This inefficiency is then decomposed into several 
components.  In the figures, these differences are roughly represented by the 
difference between the AC,,  and AC,,  lines. The exact maintained  assump- 
tions here are that the error terms within the lowest- and highest-cost quartiles 
reflect only  randomly  distributed  measurement  error and  luck  and  that the 
differences between the lowest- and highest-cost quartiles reflect only market 
factors and inefficiencies. 
A benefit of the thick-frontier approach is that it requires less specificity in 
the maintained statistical assumptions,  and therefore is less likely to be sub- 
stantially violated by the data. First, the assumption that the inefficiencies are 
uncorrelated with the regressors,  maintained  in the econometric approach, is 
not needed. Second, our assumption that the error terms for the quartiles sat- 
isfy standard regression properties seems no worse than (a)  the econometric 
approach  assumption  that inefficiencies  are from an arbitrary  (half-normal) 
distribution, or (b)  the DEA assumption that random error is zero. Third, even 
if  the error terms within  quartiles  represent  inefficiencies,  rather than only 
random error as maintained, the thick-frontier approach remains a valid com- 
parison of the average inefficiencies of  high- and low-cost firms. Finally, as 
discussed below, the cost quartiles are quite stable over time and are inversely 258  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
related to long-term profits, both of  which are consistent with the cost differ- 
ences between quartiles reflecting long-term inefficiencies.  I9 
7.2.3 
A separate equation is specified for each of  three types of costs: physical 
operating costs, interest costs on produced deposits, and interest costs on pur- 
chased funds (which sum to total costs). This permits the use of known, exact 
prior information on which types of  bank outputs affect which types of costs 
and also allows us to draw separate conclusions about inefficiencies in each of 
these three cost areas. As discussed in section 7.1, the specified bank outputs 
are two types of produced deposits-demand  and time and savings deposits 
(DD and TS)-and  three types of loans-real  estate, commercial and indus- 
trial, and installment loans (RE, CI, and IN). Inputs are labor (L),  physical 
capital (K), and purchased funds (PF). 
There is one translog cost equation for each of the three types of  cost and 
an input share equation for operating expenses: 
l5 
lnOC = a1  + C P;  lnYi + - C C 
i= I  2 j=] j=l 
Specification of the Thick Frontier 
5 
lnYilnYj + A;  I~B 
L  i= 1  m=l 
n=  I  I=  I 
where OC  = operating costs owing to (1) labor and (2) physical capital and 
other expenses; SOC, = share of operating costs paid to input 1 (labor); ID = 
interest on deposits (demand and retail time and savings deposits); IPF  = 
interest on purchased funds (federal funds purchased, large CDs, foreign de- 
19.  For a more extensive discussion  of  the differences among the frontier approaches,  see 
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posits, and other liabilities for borrowed money); Yi = real dollar amount of 
output i, (1) demand deposits, (2) time and savings deposits, (3) real estate 
loans, (4) commercial and industrial loans, and (5) installment loans; OA  = 
other assets; B  = number of banking offices; and w,,,  = price of input m,  (1) 
labor and (2) capital. Coefficients are indicated by a,  p, A, T,  y, and p; error 
terms are indicated by  E. The superscripts on the coefficients and error terms 
signify the equation numbers and the$  subscripts on equation (5) refer to size 
class and quartile.,O  All dollar-value data are in  real terms (using the GNP 
deflator), as are all the cross-year comparisons shown below.  Note that the 
characteristics of deposits as both inputs (interest costs, ID) and outputs (real 
dollar values Y,  ,  Y,, reflecting transactions and account maintenance service 
flows) are included in the model. 
7.2.4  Bank Inefficiency Measures and Empirical Results 
Decomposition of  diyerences between the highest- and lowest-cost quartiles. 
The model shown in equations (2)-(5) was estimated by iterative seemingly 
unrelated regression (ITSUR) for banks in the lowest-cost quartile and for 
banks in the highest-cost quartile (performed separately for banks in branch- 
ing and unit banking states). For each size class, the proportionate difference 
in unit costs between high-cost and low-cost banks to be decomposed is 
where ACQi  _=  eQ1(XQi)ITAQi,  eQ1  is the predicted cost function using the pa- 
rameter estimates of equations (2)-(5) obtained using the Qi data, XQ'  is the 
vector of mean outputs and other regressors for the size class for the ith quar- 
tile, and TAQ~  is the mean total assets for the size class for the ith quartile (size 
class scripts are suppressed for expositional ease). Thus, Diff is the propor- 
tional increase in predicted unit costs of Q4  data relative to the Ql data, eval- 
uated at the mean of each size class. 
Differences in output levels and mix,  branch offices, other assets,  input 
prices, and purchased funds levels are not necessarily the result of inefficien- 
cies.  These are attributed to exogenous differences in the local markets in 
which banks operate. Therefore, the part of  Diff owing to these data differ- 
ences is referred to as the market component, or 
(7) 
20.  The purchased funds equation (5) is restricted so that there are  no scale or product mix 
effects within a size class-quartile pairing. This corresponds to a national market for these funds 
in which every bank has virtually the same opportunities. However, banks in different quartiles 
may pay different average rates and have different efficiencies because they take different positions 
in the market with respect to maturity structure or funds type or because they respond differently 
to changes in market conditions. This restriction improved estimation performance considerably. 
Additional details of the model are in Berger and Humphrey (1991). 260  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
where ACQ4* = eQ1(XQ4)/TAQ4.  Equation (7) differs from (6)  in that the pre- 
dicted cost for Q4 data is evaluated using the efficient technology (estimated 
from the Q 1 thick-frontier cost function),  rather than the inefficient technol- 
ogy (estimated from Q4 data). Embedded  in the computation of  &'(XQ4) is 
the assumption  that an efficient firm would pay the average interest rate on 
purchased funds actually paid by Ql firms. Thus, Market captures the effects 
on costs of differences in the levels of the data (XQ" versus XQ'),  but not in the 
cost function, because costs are evaluated using only the parameters from the 
efficient cost function (&I). 
The remaining differences in average costs that cannot be attributed to out- 
put levels and mix, branch offices, other assets, input prices, and purchased 
funds levels are assumed to be owing to inefficiencies: 
(8)  Ineff = [ACQ4 -  A(?Q4*]/  ACQ' =  Dif -  Market. 
Zneff captures only the difference in the estimated cost functions that are taken 
to represent inefficiency, holding the data constant at Q4. Included in Zneff  are 
financial  inefficiencies  in  the  payment  of  produced  deposit  and  purchased 
funds interest, as well as operating inefficiencies in the use of physical labor 
and capital.  21 
Inefficiencies  can be  decomposed  into several  sources by  examining  the 
differences in predicted costs attributable to each cost equation separately. For 
example, the proportion of Ineff owing to operating cost inefficiencies is given 
by 
(9) 
where AeE  and AeEF  in the numerator indicate the same predicted  average 
costs as in the denominator, except that only operating costs are included. The 
inefficiencies owing to interest on deposits and purchased funds are computed 
in similar fashion.** 
Market factors and bank ineficiency. Table I.  3 shows the value of Diff and 
its  decomposition  for banks  in both  branching  and  unit  banking  states for 
1980, 1984, and 1988. The table includes computations for the overall mean 
of the data and for the mean exclusive of banks in the largest size class (over 
$10 billion in assets), which are not well matched in size and can be distort- 
ing. The differences in predicted costs range from 19 percent to 44 percent for 
21.  The inefficiency measure also reflects cost diffeiences among banks not specified as market 
factors-quality  differences, left-out variables, and measurement errors. These additional effects 
are believed to be small. Banking output is quite homogenous across banks within a size class, so 
quality differentials are negligible. The problem of having a limited number of regional prices for 
the capital input is of greater concern, but this is mitigated by the fact that capital has only about a 
15 percent share in total costs. 
22.  Data and variable definitions are given in more detail in appendix table 7A.  1. The results 
are virtually unchanged when the large banks (assets over $1 billion) are dropped, but the robust- 
ness of the large bank results cannot be verified because there are too few of  them per  quartile to 
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Table 7.3  Decomposition of Costs between Highest- and Lowest-Cost Quartiles 
1980-1988 (%) 
Year 
Difference in Predicted  Total Market Factors  Total Inefficiencies 
Average Costs 
(Dim  (Market)  (IneKI 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1980: 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 





Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
1984: 
1988: 






















19.5  -6.2 














Note: Columns (2) and (3) sum to column (I). See Berger and Humphrey (1990, appendix tables 
A2A, A2B, and A2C) for size class detail. 
all banks over all time periods (col.  l), similar to the raw data in figure 7.1. 
When this difference is decomposed into market factors (col. 2)  and a residual 
reflecting  inefficiencies  (col.  3), the  inefficiencies  clearly  dominate.  Also, 
when the results are disaggregated  by  size class  (not  shown),  the  smallest 
firms show the greatest inefficiencies, consistent with figure 7.1  .23 
Decomposing  ineficiency into operating and Jinancial components. Table 
7.4 shows the decomposition of inefficiencies (Znef)  for the same three years. 
For banks other than those in the largest size classes, operating cost inefficien- 
cies (col.  1) are generally substantially greater than either of the financial (in- 
terest  cost)  inefficiencies  (cols.  2  and  3). For the  largest banks,  purchased 
funds inefficiencies  generally are largest and significantly  affect the figures 
shown for the overall mean. This is because purchased funds are intensively 
used by large banks (so their weight is higher) and because the rates on these 
funds are quite volatile and banks differ in their speeds of adjustment to rela- 
tive rate changes among purchased funds categories. 
During this period, there were a number of  significant regulatory changes 
that  (a)  removed  interest  rate  ceilings  on savings and  small time  deposits 262  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
Table 7.4  Decomposition of Inefficiencies between Highest- and Lowest-Cost 
Quartiles, 1980-1988  (%) 
Year 
Operating Cost  Produced Deposit Interest  Purchased Funds Interest 
(IneffJ  (Ine&;,)  (IneffJ 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1980: 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 





Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
Overall mean 
Mean < $10 billion 
1984: 
1988: 
Brunch Bunking States 
9.9  3  .O 
13.9  5.0 
12.7  2.8 
16.4  3.9 
22.6  1.1 
25.9  1.2 
Unit Banking States 
14.6  2.6 
17.7  3.6 
14.0  -0.2 
15.7  -0.1 
21.3  -  0.3 













Notes: Percentages add up to total inefficiencies. Columns (1). (2). and (3) sum to column (3) in 
table 7.3. See Berger and Humphrey (1990, appendix tables A3A, A3B, and A3C) for size class 
detail. 
(starting in  1981 and completed in  1986); and (b)  permitted banks to offer 
checkable consumer accounts that paid an uncontrolled interest rate (starting 
in 1981 and expanded in 1982). From this perspective, 1980 may be viewed 
as a prederegulation period, 1984 as a mid-deregulation period, and 1988 as a 
postderegulation period by which time the adjustments to deregulation may or 
may not have been completed. 
The usual expectation is that deregulation reduces inefficiency in the long 
run, but there is some question as to how long that process takes. As seen in 
table 7.4, operating cost inefficiencies, the main source of  inefficiencies and 
the one expected to be most affected by deregulation, remained approximately 
constant from  1980 to  1984 and then increased significantly from  1984 to 
1988. This pattern was particularly pronounced for larger banks. Thus, oper- 
ating cost dispersion has increased, and it appears that the adjustment process 
to the new less regulated equilibrium may not yet be completed. Prior to the 
1980s, banks substituted operating expenses (more convenient offices and free 
deposit services) for their inability to pay market rates on all deposits. After 
interest ceilings were raised and many zero-interest consumer demand bal- 263  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
ances shifted to interest-earning checking accounts, the substitution of  oper- 
ating costs for interest expenses was reversed. The optimal mix between the 
provision of banking services and the payment of interest to depositors shifted 
in  favor of  the latter, but movement to the new equilibrium mix  took time 
because it required closing branches and other capital changes, staff reorgani- 
zations, and so on. 
Some additional data on the changes in real deposits per branch office tend 
to support this explanation of the time pattern of inefficiencies. From 1980 to 
1984, real deposits per branch office grew 3.8 percent for banks in branching 
states and then increased by 13.2 percent from 1984 to 1988. This difference 
is even more pronounced for the larger size classes. Apparently, it took several 
years for banks to arrange branch closings and mergers to reduce the service/ 
interest ratio toward its new equilibrium and large banks on average moved at 
a faster pace. One reason for the delay is that many banks likely had  new 
branches in the planning and  building pipeline before determining the full 
effects of deregulation. Consistent with this explanation, the total number of 
branches  nationwide continued to  grow,  but  at  a decreasing rate  over the 
1980s, even as many large banks were closing branche~.~~ 
Technical versus allocative ineficiency. Operating inefficiencies may be fur- 
ther decomposed into their technical and allocative components, which derive 
from proportionate overuse and incorrect mix, respectively, of  the physical 
labor and capital inputs. Using the methodology of Kopp and Diewert (1982) 
and Zieschang (1983), the main result (not shown) is that almost all of  the 
operating cost inefficiencies are in the technical category, with less than  10 
percent owing to allocative inefficiencies for all three years analyzed. 
7.2.5  The Relationship between Cost Dispersion and Bank Failure 
The importance of cost dispersion or inefficiency in banking ultimately de- 
pends on whether banks identified as high cost have difficulty competing. This 
issue is examined by  determining the relationship between costs and bank 
failures, the premiere measure of competitiveness. Over the nine years from 
1981 to 1989, 1,074 banks failed, a substantial increase over previous postwar 
decades when typically fewer than ten banks per year failed. Without ques- 
tion, the deregulation of deposits in the early 1980s played a part in raising 
failure rates, raising costs directly through the removal of interest ceilings on 
deposits and increasing the competition among banks. Although it is not pos- 
sible to say that high costs by themselves caused any banks to fail, the analy- 
23. See our working paper (Berger and Humphrey  1990, appendix tables A2A, A2B, A2C) 
for this disaggregation. 
24. Total banking offices grew 3.2  percent from 1980 to 1981, 1.8 percent from 1984 to  1985, 
and  1.6 percent from  1987 to  1988. At  the same time, many large banks cut branch operations 
and staff severely. As examples, Bank  of America cut branches by  27 percent (about 350 off- 
ices) and staff by 34 percent; Manufacturers Hanover reduced staff by 24 percent. Despite these 
and many similar cuts, a study for the American Bankers Association (Booz-Allen and Hamilton 
1987) reported that  as of  1986 about half  of all  branches remained unprofitable and required 
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sis below suggests that having relatively high costs is a consistent associated 
factor. 
For each of  the three  years  1980,  1984, and  1988, all banks  have been 
ranked into four average cost quartiles (as noted above). From these rankings, 
the cost quartile position for each bank that failed in a subsequent year was 
determined. The summary results are presented in table 7.5. Of the 768 banks 
that failed over the nine years,  1981-89,  and had been started up by 1980 and 
had complete call report data for that year, 41 percent were in the highest-cost 
quartile (Q4) during  1980. This is more than three times as many as the  13 
percent that were in the lowest-cost quartile (Ql). Of the 748 that failed after 
1984 but existed and had complete data for 1984, 57 percent were from Q4, 
more than eight times as many as the 7 percent that were in Ql  . Finally, of the 
178 banks that failed in 1989 and had complete data in 1988, 66 percent were 
ranked as having the highest costs, almost 15 times as many as were ranked 
in the lowest-cost quartile. As these results indicate, high-cost banks incur an 
appreciably greater probability of failure, and this probability increases as the 
time of failure nears. 
There  are  several  possible  reasons  for this  positive  relationship between 
high  costs and  bank  failure: First, the high  leverage-low  spread  nature  of 
banking means that a relatively small increase in costs can wipe out earnings 
and financial capital relatively quickly. Second, high costs tend to be sympto- 
matic of poor management  in general.  Firms that control costs poorly  also 
tend to have poorly  conceived loan policies that contribute to a high failure 
probability. Third, high costs reduce expected rates of return on equity, ceteris 
paribus,  which may  induce a high-cost bank to increase expected return by 
undertaking more risky activities (i.e., shift to a point further out on its risk- 
expected  return  possibilities  frontier),  increasing the probability  of  failure. 
This  may  be  accentuated  by  the  moral  hazard  aspects of  FDIC insurance. 
When either of the latter two explanations hold, costs contribute to the failure, 
but the reported reason may be fraud or a high-risk loan portfolio. 
7.2.6  The Stability and Relationship to Profits of Low-Cost and 
High-Cost Banks 
With the exception of the small effect of the market factors, the differences 
in  costs between  the  high-  and  low-cost  banks  have largely  been attributed 
here to an inefficiency residual.  However,  it is also possible that these cost 
differences may reflect short-term differences in luck or omitted variables such 
as product quality or risk. In this section, we investigate these alternatives by 
examining the stability of the cost quartiles and their relationship with long- 
term profits.25 
25.  Another potential explanation of  the cost differences between quartiles, differences in mo- 
nopsony power. may be ruled out as unimportant. The component of the market factors owing to 
differences in input prices for capital and labor is trivial. Also, although some previous research 
suggests that banks exercise monopsony power in setting deposit interest rates (see Berger and 265  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
Table 7.5  Cost Quartile Ranking of Banks That Failed over 1981-1989  (%) 
Cost Quartile 
Failure Percentage by  Quartile 
1980  1984  1988 
Q4 (highest cost)  41.4  57.4  65.7 
43  24.1  24.5  21.3 
Q2  20.6  11.2  8.4 
No. of failed banks operating 
QI (lowest cost)  13.3  7.0  4.5 
in year of quartile ranking  768  748  178 
Table 7.6  Stability and Relation to Profits of Cost Quartiles: Correspondence  of 
Low-Cost and High-Cost Banks for three Single Years with Cost and 
Profit Quartiles Formed Using Data from 1980,1984, 1988 
Combined 
Banks in Cost Q1 for a 
Single Year (%) 
Banks in Cost Q4 for a 
Single Year (%) 
No. of 
Q1  42  43  44  Q1  42  43  Q4  Banks 
Long-term Cost Quartiles 
Branching states  76  20  4  1  0  3  21  76  5,403 
Unit states  75  20  4  1  0  4  21  74  1.625 
Long-term Profit Quartiles 
Branchingstates  49  27  15  9  11  18  26  45  5,403 
Unit states  49  30  14  7  14  14  24  48  1,625 
The upper half of table 7.6 examines the stability or consistency over time 
of the lowest- and highest-cost quartiles (Ql and Q4, respectively) by show- 
ing the correspondence  between  the quartiles  for the three individual years 
separately  and quartiles  formed by  combining  the  cost data  from all  three 
years  together.  To  avoid  the  problems  of  entry,  exit, merger,  and  altered 
branching laws, we focus on only those banks that (1) existed in all three years 
and (2) were in states that did not switch between unit and branching status. 
As  shown, 76 percent of banks we rank in Ql using a single year’s data also 
had costs in the lowest quartile for the three years combined. That is, 76 per- 
cent of the 1980, 1984, and 1988 Ql banks were also in Ql for the combined 
data set. Further, 96 percent of Ql banks had costs over time below the me- 
dian and only 1 percent had costs in the highest quartile using all three years’ 
data. Similarly, 76 percent of the banks we rank in Q4 had costs in the highest 
quartile for the three years combined, 97 percent remained above the median, 
Hannan  1989), such an effect on total costs would be small, because differences in predicted 
deposit interest costs constitute only about 12 percent of the total predicted cost difference. 266  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
and less than half of  1 percent were in the lowest quartile for the three years 
combined. These stability results suggest that the differences in costs between 
quartiles  do in fact represent  long-term differences  in firm-specific efficien- 
cies, rather than short-term differences in luck or measurement error, because 
the latter explanations would imply little stability in the quartiles over time. 
Moreover,  our efficiency  comparisons  between  banks  in  the  lowest-  and 
highest-cost quartiles would only in very rare circumstances involve a misor- 
dering of efficiencies.26 
The lower half of table 7.6  examines the relationship between the cost quar- 
tiles for individual years and long-term profits by computing profit quartiles 
that average net income per dollar of assets for the three years combined. The 
data show that the costs are strongly negatively related to long-term profits- 
being in the lowest-cost  quartile (Ql) in a single year makes it from five to 
seven times as likely that a bank will be in the highest long-term profit quartile 
(Ql) than in the lowest profit quartile (Q4). Similarly, being in the highest- 
cost quartile for a single year makes it from three to four times as likely that a 
bank will be in the lowest rather than highest profit quartile.*’ These data are 
consistent with inefficiency being the dominating explanation of the difference 
in costs between quartiles  but are not consistent with the omitted effects of 
product quality differences or bank risk being dominant.  If  high-cost  banks 
simply spent more on service quality and were  reimbursed  on the revenue 
side, then the cost quartiles would not be highly related to profits. Similarly, 
if high-cost banks simply chose high risk-high  expected return financial strat- 
egies and had high costs because they paid high-risk premia for their funds, 
then costs would  be positively,  rather than negatively,  related to profits  on 
average.  28 
7.3  Shifts in the Thick Frontier over Time 
Overall unit costs in an industry can change over time because of (1) tech- 
nical innovation (reflected primarily by shifts in the minimum cost frontier); 
26.  An  alternative method of  examining stability, which yielded similar results (not shown), 
was also employed. It was found that being in either Ql or Q4 in  1980 made it three to five times 
more likely that the bank would again be in that quartile in 1988, rather than migrating to the other 
extreme. Our use of cost stability over time to identify the presence of inefficiencies from luck is 
analogous to Gordon’s (1965) use of cost stability over product lines to identify managerial ineffi- 
ciency in airlines. 
27.  There is also evidence that the strong, negative relationship between costs and profits held 
in the 1970s as well as in the 1980s. See Kwast and Rose (1983). 
28.  One caveat to this analysis is that average total costs, the basis of the quartile rankings, is 
functionally related to the dependent variables in the cost regressions and this could bias the slope 
coefficients. That is, the quartiles are based on (OC + ID  + IPF)/TA, while InOC, InlD, and 
lnlPF are the dependent variables. However, for several reasons discussed in Berger and Hum- 
phrey (1991), this does not appear to present a serious problem. The most important reason is that 
the quartiles were formed separately by  13 size classes, which removes the great majority of  the 
relationship between the cost variables and the quartiles, because the overwhelming determinant 
of InOC, lnlD, and ldPF is bank size. E.g., the smallest bank in the largest size class (over $10 
billion in assets) is more than  I ,OOO  times larger than the largest bank in the smallest size class 
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(2) changes in average efficiency or the variability of  market conditions (re- 
flected primarily by changes in the dispersion of costs from the frontier); and 
(3) the effects of regulatory changes and other disequilibrium phenomena (re- 
flected in both shifts in the frontier and changes in the dispersion from it). The 
dispersion analysis of the previous section showed (a)  that banking costs were 
substantially dispersed from the frontier; (b)  that this dispersion was largely 
dominated by efficiency differences; and (c)  that the dispersion increased con- 
siderably between 1984 and 1988. Results (a)  and (b)  suggest that efficiency 
was important and result (c)  suggests that there may have been some disequi- 
librium effects from deregulation remaining in 1988. 
This section focuses on frontier shifts over time in order to determine the 
effects of technical change and deregulation as well as the associated disequi- 
librium. By  confining attention to the thick frontier, the effects of  technical 
change and regulation can be determined without the confounding influence 
of changes in the dispersion of costs from the frontier. 
7.3.1 
The deregulation of  bank interest rates and the development of  interest- 
earning consumer checking accounts in the early 1980s had a direct effect of 
transferring moneys from banks to consumers by  increasing deposit interest 
rates.29  In effect, banks had  some legally enforced monopsony power over 
retail depositors, primarily on their checking accounts, which was eliminated. 
The direct effect on interest expenses of  banks is independent of  bank effi- 
ciency, because insured banks in the same market must pay approximately the 
same (service-adjusted) deposit rates whether they are efficient or not. 
Table 7.7  shows how deposit rate deregulation has decreased bank monop- 
sony power over depositors. The first row  of the table shows total (implicit 
and explicit) deposit revenues for  1980, 1984,  and  1988, calculated as in 
equation  1  above. The implicit revenues on deposits declined over time as 
deposit rates moved closer to market rates,  but explicit revenues were not 
raised sufficiently to cover the implicit revenue reductions. Although deposit 
revenues were cut almost in half in real terms from  1980 to  1988, deposit 
operating costs increased, virtually eliminating deposits as a profit center (as 
estimated profits fell from $61.2 billion to $3.9 billion). Thus, deregulation 
caused banks to pay out substantially more interest, and this was not offset 
either by increases in explicit fees or by reductions in operating costs. 
The Effect of Deregulation on Deposit Costs and Revenues 
7.3.2  Shifts in the Thick Frontier and Their Decomposition 
The shifts in the thick frontier over time are computed and decomposed in 
much  the  same way  as  the  difference between the  thick  frontier and  the 
highest-cost quartile  were computed and  decomposed in  section 7.2. The 
29.  The deregulation of deposit rates was largely sparked by  two events: (1) the  unexpected 
inflation of the late 1970s and early  1980s, and (2) the growth of competition for bank deposits 
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Table 7.7  The Decline in Bank Deposits as a Profit Center 
(billions of 1988 dollars) 
1980  1984  1988 
Implicit & explicit revenues  98.9  65.9  51.3 
Allocated operating costs  31.7  42.5  -  41.4 
Net contribution to profits  61.2  23.4  3.9 
Nore: All figures in 1988 dollars. See Berger and Humphrey (1 990, appendix tables A  1 A, A  1 B, 
AlC) for more details. 
unadjusted shift in the frontier from year t to t  + 4 (analogous to the differ- 
ence in average costs between quartiles DzT) is given by 
(10)  UShift = [A&+'  -  Ae]  /AO, 
where A&  = &(X.)/TAs, es  is the predicted cost function using Ql data for 
year s, X.  is the mean argument vector for Ql for years, and Tk  is the mean 
total assets for Ql for years (Ql scripts are suppressed for convenience in this 
section). Next, the frontier shift is corrected for exogenous differences in the 
data that may be owing to changes in market factors (i.e., input prices, output 
levels and mix, branch  offices,  and purchased  funds levels).  Holding these 
factors in X constant at their time t-values gives the adjusted frontier shift: 
(1 1)  Ash$  = [Atr* -  A&] /At', 
where At'* = &+'  (X')ITA'. 
A further adjustment must be made for an additional market factor not ex- 
plicitly  included in the cross-section  analyses: aggregate interest  rates. The 
large swings in aggregate rates during the 1980s undoubtedly had large effects 
on bank interest costs. The cost function parameters in  in equation (1 1) 
implicitly include the aggregate interest rate prevailing at time t + 4 and apply 
it to data vectorXr. To subtract out this effect, it is assumed that in the absence 
of technical change and regulation, purchased funds interest rates would move 
in lockstep with the 90-day Treasury Bill rate, i,.  This corresponds with the 
national nature of the purchased funds (PF) market and the fact that  i,  is an 
appropriate opportunity cost of  funds for most participants. For time and sav- 
ings deposits (TS), rates normally do not move as freely with market rates, 
because they have a service component and appear to provide depositors with 
some implicit insurance against swings in market rates.30  It is assumed that in 
the absence of technical change and deregulation, the annual average TS in- 
terest rate (i,)  would move proportionately with i,.  Making these two adjust- 
ments to Ash$  gives the final shift in the frontier to be decomposed: 
FShift  = Ash$  -  {[(ik;'  -  ikB) .  (PF'/TA') 
(12) 
+ ((i;;4/i;B)  ikS - i;J  *  (TS'/TA')]IAC'}. 
30.  See Hannan and Berger (1990) for an examination of the rigidity of deposit interest rates. 269  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
The shifts in the thick frontier over 1980-84  and over 1984-88  are shown 
by bank size class in table 7.8. Columns (1) and (2) show a striking contrast- 
the unadjusted frontier shifts (UShif)  indicate increases in costs for all but the 
very largest size class of  efficient banks in the 1980-84  interval, followed by 
Table 7.8  Shifts in the Thick Cost Frontier: 1980-1984 and 1984-1988 
(total percentage change over 4 years, in 1988 dollars) 
~ 
Shift Adjusted for Market 
Factors and Interest Rates  Unadjusted Frontier Shift 
CrShift (%)  FSh$t  (%) 
Asset Size Class  1980-84  1984-88  1980-84  1984-88 















Mean < 10.000* 
0-10 










5W  10,000 
Over 10,000 
Overall mean* 
Mean < 1O,OOO* 
Ejicient Banks in Branch Banking States 
32.0  -  14.6  33.5 
25.2  -  18.0  30.2 
22.3  -  18.7  26.7 
19.8  -  18.5  22.9 
18.9  -  18.4  21.1 
17.4  -  18.0  18.4 
13.5  -  19.6  15.8 
15.5  -  16.9  15.6 
11.5  -  16.2  11.3 
9.7  -  19.1  11.1 
5.1  -  19.3  5.6 
4.7  -  18.5  2.4 
-  3.8  -  22.6  3.3 
7.3  -  19.6  10.0 
12.2  -  18.4  13.0 
ESficient Banks in Unir Banking States 
33.9  -  15.0 
26.1  -  20.0 
22.5  -  20.0 
18.0  -21.4 
18.5  -21.5 
14.0  -  22.2 
12.7  -  22. I 
11.9  -  21.6 
11.9  -  28.1 
3.5  -  20.9 
-  2.8  -  19.6 
16.7  $ 














12.4  -21.4  12.6 
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-  0.6 
-  1.7 
-  3.2 
-  4.2 
-7.1 
-  9.5 
-  5.9 
$ 
$ 
-  1.7 
$ 
*The mean values reported are asset share weighted sums of the size classes indicated. 
$There were too few large unit banks to form quartiles in  1988 for the top 2 size classes. Thus 
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decreases in costs for all sizes from 1984 to 1988. Over 1980-84,  small banks 
experienced more severe cost increases than large banks. This is largely be- 
cause small banks tend to fund more with produced deposits, for which the 
average rate paid increased from 4.7 percent to 7.0 percent (because of dereg- 
ulation); large banks more often use purchased funds, for which the average 
rate paid decreased from 1 1.6 percent to 8.7 percent. This suggests that dereg- 
ulation  hurt  smaller banks  more than  large banks over this time period.  In 
contrast,  the  unadjusted  frontier  shift  over  1984-88  affected  banks  more 
equally because interest rates on produced deposits and purchased funds both 
fell over this time period. 
Columns (3)  and (4) of table 7.8 show the same frontier shifts after adjust- 
ing for market factors and aggregate interest rates (FShijft).  The net effect of 
these  two  adjustments  is to offset one another for  1980-84,  so FShijr  and 
USh@ are  about the same. In  contrast,  for  1984-88,  the  removal  of  local 
market factors was swamped by the continuing fall in market rates, so that the 
fall in costs is essentially eliminated once all adjustments are made. 
The shifts in the adjusted frontier (FShift) can be further decomposed by 
cost type into operating costs, interest on produced deposits, and interest on 
purchased  funds, each of which has a different economic interpretation. The 
change in operating costs over time among the efficient firms is interpreted as 
representing net technical change, which includes pure technical change, any 
changes in the level of service produced per dollar of deposits and loans as a 
result of deregulation, and any disequilibrium effects on the operating costs of 
the best practice banks. The former two are expected to reduce costs because 
technical  changes generally  reduce  costs  and  because banks  would  be  ex- 
pected to provide less service per dollar of deposits after deregulation (e.g., 
by  increasing the level of real deposits per branch office) in an optimal trade- 
off  with the higher deposit interest rates. The disequilibrium effects are ex- 
pected to raise costs as banks incur short-term costs in adjusting to their new 
long-term equilibrium by shutting branch  offices, and so on. The change in 
interest on deposits net of aggregate interest rate changes is interpreted as the 
direct effect of  the deregulation of deposit interest rates. As mentioned above, 
these rates went up over 1980-84,  even while market rates were decreasing. 
The  change  in  interest  on purchased  funds  net  of  aggregate  interest  rate 
changes is a residual reflecting  maturity, liquidity, or  credit risk changes in 
purchased funds rates not captured by changes in the Treasury Bill rate.3' 
These separate effects are shown in table 7.9 for all sizes of  banks.  The 
percentage shift in each type of cost is weighted by its share of total costs, so 
that the figures sum to FSh$  in table 7.8. Column (1) shows that operating 
costs per dollar of assets increased as deregulation began in the 1980-84  in- 
terval, particularly for banks in the smallest size classes. Column (2) indicates 
a slightly better performance in the  1984-88  interval, with the smaller banks 
31.  This does not rule out the possibility that technology can reduce interest costs by improving 
the monitoring of market conditions, etc. However, such effects are swamped by aggregate inter- 
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Table 7.9  Net Technical Change and Deregulation Effects: 1980-1984  and 1984-1988 
(total percentage change over 4 years, in  1988 dollars) 
Operating Cost  Interest on Deposits  Interest on 
Technical Change (%)  (%)  Residual Effect (%) 
Net  Deregulation Effect  Purchased Funds 
Asset Size Class  1980-84  1984-88  1980-84  1984-88  1980-84  1984-88 















Mean < 10.000 
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EDcienr Banks in Branching States 
2.6  24.2  3.5 
2.9  22.9  1.2 
2.0  20.5  0.7 
1.4  18.1  0.3 
0.8  16.9  0.4 
0.1  15.1  0.1 
-  0.3  13.4  0.1 
-  1.2  12.8  -0.3 
-  2.2  11.4  -0.4 
-4.2  10.4  -0.9 
-4.3  6.9  -1.0 
-3.3  8.7  0.0 
-  1.9  2.8  -  1.3 
-1.9  9.4  -0.5 
-1.9  12.3  -  0.2 
EfJicient Banks in Unit Banking States 
10.5  7.4  20.6  -  3.4 
7.8  5.8  18.1  -  2.4 
5.5  4.0  15.5  -  2.3 
3.7  2.3  13.8  -2.1 
3.3  1.1  12.5  -  1.9 
2.3  0.2  10.9  -  2.0 
0.4  -  1.4  7.9  -2.1 
0.1  -3.9  7.2  -  1.8 
-0.3  -4.2  6.6  -  1.8 
-  2.6  -11.3  0.2  0.1 
-0.2  -  12.2  0.0  -0.9 
-  0.9  *  -0.6  * 
-  1.6  *  -1.1  * 
2.0  -0.9  8.5  -  1.9 
2.4  *  9.6  * 
1.2  0.2 
0.1  0.5 
1.1  0.4 
1.1  0.4 
1.5  1.2 
I  .4  0.4 
1 .o  1.2 
2.3  2.0 
-0.2  1.7 
-0.7  1.3 
-1.1  4.2 
-9.1  7.8 
-3.1  3.7 
-  1.6  3.1 
-1.0  2.9 
1.5  0.1 
0.9  0.4 
1.7  0.4 
2.1  0.2 
3.1  0.3 
2.0  0.1 
2.8  0.3 
4.9  1.5 
3.2  -1.1 
-  3.2  1.6 
0.6  7.1 
10.9  * 
-2.3  * 
2.1  1  .o 
2.6  * 
Note: Columns (l), (3), and (5) sum to column (3) in table 7.8 and columns (2), (4), and (6) sum 
column (4) in table 7.8 by construction. 
*see t in table 7.8. 
showing a lesser cost increase; the larger banks had cost decreases that offset 
the increases in the earlier interval. Under normal circumstances (i.e., equilib- 
rium  growth),  these results,  particularly  those for smaller banks, would be 
quite unusual,  because technical progress is rarely negative for such a long 
interval of  time. However, the 1980s were not normal circumstances and the 272  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
results may be interpreted as representing substantial disequilibrium brought 
about by deregulation.  As mentioned above, deregulation altered the balance 
previously obtained where capital (mainly extra branches) and labor partially 
compensated depositors for artificially low rates paid on deposits. When rates 
were deregulated, higher deposit rates were established faster than capital and 
labor were reduced. When the new equilibrium is reached, average costs are 
expected to be lower because of pure technical innovation and a lower level of 
service per dollar of  deposits  as banks eliminate  the extra service that was 
substituted  for  legally  prohibited  interest  payments.32 The  evidence  cited 
above on the large increase in real deposits per branch office in the 1984-88 
interval suggests that banks were still overbranched and overstaffed and were 
bearing the transition costs of closing some branches. In addition, to the ex- 
tent that banks had excess capacity  as a result of  the temporary disequilib- 
rium, the increase in average operating costs may be overstated as a measure 
of negative technical change (see Berndt and Fuss 1986).” 
Columns (3) and (4) of table 7.9 show that deregulation increased deposit 
interest costs from 1980-84,  when most of the initial rate increases occurred, 
but had little effect from 1984-88.  As mentioned above, the interest cost in- 
creases from deregulation  are much  greater for smaller banks, who tend to 
secure a higher proportion of their funds from produced deposits. Columns 
(5) and (6) show the residual purchased funds effects, which are small as ex- 
pected, except for the largest banks which use these funds intensively. 
Table 7.10 expresses these effects in annual rates of change for all sizes of 
Ql banks together and allows for examination of the net effects over the entire 
eight-year interval. The first two columns simply reexpress the effects in table 
7.9 in  annual terms;  the  final column represents  a new  computation of  the 
frontier shift between 1980 and 1988 using 1980 as a base year. These results 
suggest that slight technical progress over the last four years offsets the dis- 
equilibrium  cost  increases  of  the  first four  years.  For banks  in  branching 
states, there is a small net annualized reduction in operating costs over the 
entire eight-year  period.  For banks in unit banking  states, where there was 
less latitude for cost savings through branch office closings, there was no net 
measured  progress.  When this  information  is  combined  with  the  findings 
given earlier that (1) measured inefficiencies were still relatively high in 1988; 
(2) smaller banks still had higher operating costs in 1988 than in 1984; and (3) 
the growth of banking offices was still decelerating in  1988, it suggests that 
the banking industry had still not reached its new post-deregulation equilib- 
rium by 1988. The effect of deregulation on produced deposit interest costs is 
32.  An  exception to this would be a technical innovation that both  increased costs and  in- 
creased the quality of  service. The advent of  the automated teller machine (ATM) may fit this 
category. Undoubtedly, ATMs increased the quality of bank service. There is also some evidence 
(see Berger 1985) that ATMs may have raised bank costs, especially during the 1980-84  interval 
when many machines were not at mature volume. 
in  (I  1) 
estimated for 1984 may overstate costs owing to excess capacity at that time, yielding an increased 
operating cost component of FShifr. 
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Table 7.10  Cost Effects of Technical Change and Deregulation: Annual Growth 
Rates (at the mean for the low-cost banks) (%) 
1980-84  1984-88  1980-88 
Branch banking states: 
Net technical change (oc)  0.6  -0.5  -0.5 
Deregulation (ID)  2.3  -0.1  0.6 
Residual (IPF)  -0.4  0.8  0.2 
Net technical change (OC)  0.5  -0.2*  0.  I* 
Unit banking states: 
Deregulation (ID)  2.1  -0.5*  0.7* 
Residual (IPF)  0.5  0.2*  0.4* 
BLS  bank labor productivity  3.0  3.8%  3.3$ 
Source: Computed from table 7.9 plus a similar run comparing 1980 and 1988 data. 
*See $ in table 7.8. 
SBLS index available only through 1987. 
on net an increase, but it virtually all occurred in the first time interval, and its 
cumulative effect is dying out. Technical change and deregulation seem to 
have had little or no effect on purchased funds costs, as expected. Examining 
the final 1980-88  column, it appears that on net, adjusted real banking costs 
have increased slightly for banks in branching states, as operating cost im- 
provements have not quite offset additional interest payments. For unit states, 
the lesser possibilities for branch office closings to save on operating costs 
have left them with a greater increase in real costs over the  1980-88  time 
interval. 
7.3.3  Comparison with the BLS Measure of  Bank Labor Productivity 
It is instructive to compare our results with the BLS measure of bank labor 
productivity shown in the bottom row of table 7.10. The BLS measure relates 
bank output as a physical flow  (numbers of  transactions processed and new 
loans made) to a single input (labor). It would be expected that the BLS mea- 
sure would be approximately equal and of  opposite sign to our net technical 
change figures. What is observed, however, is quite different. The BLS finds 
productivity growth of  3 percent or better per annum for both the 1980-84 
and 1984-88 time intervals; we observe a slight increase followed by a slight 
decrease in costs per unit of output. 
One important reason for these seemingly incongruent results is that the 
BLS measure is based only on labor input; our measure is based on real oper- 
ating costs, which implicitly include all physical inputs and adjustments in 
their  proportion^.^^ When markets are in equilibrium, the change in labor in- 
34.  Another potential reason for these differing results is that the BLS  measure is inclusive of 
all banks, not just those on the thick cost frontier as used here. Although it is possible that the 
hanks in the three highest-cost quartiles reduced operating costs by more than enough to offset the 
increased operating costs of the lowest-cost quartile, the data suggest that, if anything, the higher- 
cost banks fared even worse than the low-cost banks over the 1980s. Thus, this possibility can be 
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put is a good proxy for the proportional change in all inputs or total operating 
costs. During the disequilibrium  of  the  1980s, however,  such relationships 
may not hold. Costs likely increased relative to employment because the ex- 
penses  of  liquidating  branches  and of  installing automated teller machines 
have often been paid to nonbank capital and labor sources, rather than to em- 
ployees of the bank (the measured labor input). In addition, to the extent that 
employment grew more slowly or decreased as a result of branch closings and 
other pressures  from deregulation,  any reductions  have  likely  been  mostly 
confined to low-cost employees  serving in branch  offices, which would de- 
crease  measured  employment  more  than  proportionate  with  true  value- 
weighted labor or total operating costs.35 
An analysis of  some raw data tends to confirm these hypotheses. Over the 
1980-84  interval, the ratio of bank employment to real operating costs for all 
banks  together  fell  at  a  3.3 percent  annual  rate.  This alone  is  more  than 
enough to explain the 3.0 percent growth in the BLS productivity index when 
in fact, productivity in terms of all factors may have fallen. It also can account 
for nearly the entire difference between the BLS 3.0 percent growth and our 
0.5 percent to 0.6 percent increase in operating costs per unit of output. Over 
the 1984-88  interval, the employment-cost ratio fell at a 2.1 percent annual 
rate, large enough to explain most of the 3.8 percent measured BLS produc- 
tivity gains and most of the deviation from our measures.  As expected,  the 
fall in labor cost share, 1.0 percent per annum for both  time intervals, was 
smaller than the fall in the employment-cost ratio, consistent with the hypoth- 
esis that  the  proportion  of  lower-paid  employees  has  decreased over time. 
This evidence suggests that the BLS measure may be misleading during peri- 
ods of significant disequilibrium. 
7.4  Conclusions 
Commercial banking is one of the most difficult service industries in which 
to measure output, technical change, or productivity growth. The problem of 
choosing which banking functions constitute the important outputs is difficult 
because many banking revenues are implicit and commingled, so that the flow 
of explicit revenues is an unreliable guide to the flow of banking services. 
However, the value-added approach, in which the flows of physical labor and 
capital inputs are matched to banking functions, identifies the important bank 
outputs as being the major deposit and loan categories. 
It is also difficult to measure technical change and productivity growth be- 
cause of the confounding effects of changes in inefficiency over time and the 
deregulation of the deposit side of  banking.  If  inefficiency is not taken  into 
35.  Our use of operating costs implicitly values labor (and capital) at their appropriate marginal 
value product weights to the extent that different prices paid to different workers accurately reflect 
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account, then measures of technical change or productivity growth may con- 
fuse shifts in the minimum-cost technology with  changes in the deviations 
from that technology. In addition, higher deposit interest rates were quickly 
adopted as a result of deregulation, but the offsetting reductions in depositor 
services (such as reducing branching convenience) have been relatively slow. 
These different factors are accounted for here by estimating multiple-equation 
thick-frontier cost functions for each of three years,  1980, 1984, and  1988, 
which  roughly  correspond  to  pre-,  mid-,  and  postderegulation periods. 
Cost dispersion and inefficiency are analyzed for each of  these years  and 
the shifts between years are decomposed into operating and financial cost cate- 
gories. 
The major findings are as follows: Most of  the dispersion in  bank costs 
appears to represent inefficiencies, rather than market factors, such as differ- 
ences in input prices, scale of operations, or product mix. Except for the very 
largest banks, the inefficiencies are mainly operational in nature, involving 
overuse of  physical labor and capital inputs, rather than financial, involving 
excessive interest costs. As well, the set of low-cost banks is seen to remain 
quite stable over time and to have the highest profits and lowest probabilities 
of failure during the  1980s, indicating that cost differences are not  simply 
owing to luck and that they are important to bank performance. In addition, 
operating cost dispersion and inefficiency rose substantially over the period, 
particularly from 1984 to 1988, suggesting a less than complete adjustment to 
the new, less regulated equilibrium. 
The shift over time in the thick-frontier cost function, after adjustment for 
changes  in  market  factors  and  aggregate  interest  rates,  shows  important 
changes in both operating and interest costs resulting from deregulation. First, 
operating costs for the low-cost banks rose over the 1980-84  interval and then 
fell over 1984-88.  However, the process was uneven, with larger banks able 
to close and restructure branch operations and otherwise reduce costs; smaller 
banks continued to have increasing operating costs over  1984-88.  Had the 
progress to the new post-deregulation equilibrium been substantially complete 
by  1988, one would have expected both technical progress and a shift toward 
supplying fewer services per dollar of  deposits to have resulted in consider- 
able net  technical change.  However, the overall change is quite small and 
uneven. Combining these findings with the increase in cost dispersion and the 
increased real  deposits per branch  office suggests that progress toward the 
postderegulation equilibrium remained incomplete by  1988, especially for 
smaller and less efficient banks. 
Second, deregulation removed a substantial source of  monopsony power 
over depositors for banks,  raising interest costs significantly and  virtually 
eliminating deposits as an independent profit center. Even by  1988, several 
years after deregulation, this increase in deposit interest costs generally was 
not offset by decreases in operating costs, except for relatively large and rela- 
tively  efficient banks.  Given the strong empirical association between high 276  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
costs and bank failures, it is likely that this loss of monopsony power contrib- 
uted to the dramatic increase in bank failures in the 1980s. 
Finally, our results contrast sharply with those of the BLS labor productiv- 
ity index for banking, which shows productivity rising at a 3 percent or more 
per annum through the 1980s. The major reason for this difference appears to 
be the use of bank employment as the single factor by BLS. 
Overall, deregulation appears to have resulted in little, if any, net technical 
change or productivity growth in banking in the  1980s. However, offsetting 
this lack of progress are the benefits of deregulation to consumers, which are 
not reflected in measured bank output. Consumers obtained a higher return on 
deposits without a fully offsetting reduction in branch office convenience or 
higher service fees. Thus, part of  the cost increases from deregulation could 
alternatively be interpreted as increases in output quality, suggesting that the 
true combined effect of technical progress and deregulation is more favorable 
than that measured here. In any event, we have identified why measured tech- 
nical change has been so slow in the  1980s-the  reason is banking deregula- 
tion and the less-than-cost-minimizing response to it by the banking industry. 277  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
Appendix 
Table 7A.1  Summary of Data (all banks, 1988) 
Branch Banking 
(10,961  banks)  (1,844 banks) 
States  Unit Banking States 
Standard  Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation 
Cost variables: 
OC 




Operating costs (% of assets)* 
Interest on produced deposits (% of 
Interest on purchased funds (% of assets)* 









B  Number of banking offices 
OA 
TA 
Demand deposits (% of assets)* 
Retail time & savings deposits (% of 
Real estate loans (% of assets)* 
Commercial & industrial loans (% of 




Other (nonloan) assets (% of  assets)* 
Total assets $OOO,OOO,  1988 dollars (not 
Price of labor, $OOO  per year, 1988 dollars 
Price of physical capital, 1988 dollars 
(assumed to be proportionate to the 
replacement cost of office space in the 
region, taken from F. W. Dodge) 































































Source: Reports of condition and income (call reports), except as noted. The flow figures are the annual 
totals from the December 1988 call; the stock figures are averages from the December 1987, June 1988, 
and December 1988 calls (to avoid biases from growth or decline over the year). 
*Numbers are expressed  relative to assets for exposition only.  Regressions are based on raw  data in 
$OOO. 
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Comment  Frank C. Wykoff 
Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey (BH) report two empirical regulari- 
ties in commercial banking activity during the 1980s: (1)  the variance in av- 
erage costs among banks in the United States was large and persistent-aver- 
age costs of the highest-cost quartile of banks exceeded average costs of  the 
lowest-cost quartile by 30 percent to 50 percent; and (2) these large unit cost 
differences are not related to bank size, branching, or other observed causal 
variables but seem to be associated with profitability and failure rates. 
BH measure and interpret these unit cost differences using two data bases- 
(1) functional cost analysis (FCA), consisting of a large but varying nonran- 
dom sample of banks who voluntarily report to the FED on the allocation of 
costs to different activities, such as deposits and loans, and (2) call reports, in 
which virtually all American banks, as required by law, report to bank regu- 
lators book values of capital, costs of funds, rates of return, and other financial 
statistics. 
The FCA data attributes value added to sources-two  categories of depos- 
its, three categories of assets, and other sources. BH find that 48 percent of 
value added comes from deposit accounts, 30 percent from loans and 22 per- 
cent from other activities.  Largely on the basis of  this evidence, BH define 
output to consist of the two deposit categories plus the three loan categories. 
BH then use call report data to estimate translog cost functions for bank 
output, with suitable normalizations, from input prices,  costs, and levels of 
outputs for the quartile of banks with the lowest average costs-BH  call this 
quartile, the most efficient banks. 
Frank C. Wykoff is Eldon Smith Professor of Economics at Pomona College and the Clarernont 
Graduate School and editor in chief of Economic Inquiry. 280  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
Figure 7C. 1 illustrates their econometric  methodology for estimating the 
cost function.  By estimating  unit costs as a function of variations  in  input 
prices and levels of outputs, they trace out the unit isoquant, q  = 1, of the 
average efficient firm by rotating isocost curves like 11.  If, given input prices, 
the average efficient bank were a cost minimizer,  then it would produce at a 
point,  such as points a and e, on the isoquant tangent to the isocost. Thus, 
both the mix of inputs and the level of costs would be optimal. 
BH compare the costs incurred by the most costly quartile,  the least effi- 
cient banks, to the estimated unit isoquant of  the efficient banks. The “least 
efficient” quartile of banks are operating beyond the frontier isoquant, q = 1, 
producing at points like b and c. The distances from b to a and from c to e, 
along rays from the origin, constitute measures of inefficiency. BH also trace 
growth of productivity of the average efficient banks over the  1980s and de- 
compose their measure between technical change and efficiency causes. Thus, 
although much of the paper focuses on efficiency issues, the authors also study 
productivity growth. 
How important are the BH results, how can they be explained, and what do 
their results have to do with output measurement and productivity growth per 
se? In  my judgment, this paper presents very  important empirical evidence 
K 








{a  bc  ’ 
Too Much Labor 
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based on comprehensive data on the nation’s banking system. The key result, 
that many banks have been operating in the 1980s at the margin-with  exces- 
sive costs and low profits, does not auger well for the banking industry should 
the economy slip into recession. Many major banks could face serious finan- 
cial stresses, and some could fail. On the brighter side, this same result im- 
plies plenty of room for improvement. Many banks could trim fat and tighten 
their belts. Such a tightening would produce a one-shot jump in productivity 
growth for the banking system as a whole. Perhaps the BH paper will spur 
banks and their regulators to move forward with this belt tightening before a 
recession forces them to do so in a crisis context. 
To correct a flawed system, though, it is helpful to know the root causes of 
the flaws. In  this context, we may wonder why do average cost differences, 
unrelated to observed explanatory variables, persist in the banking system for 
so long? I have been around Chicago economists long enough to see flares 
when told of persistent inefficiencies, and so I must ask whether these ineffi- 
ciencies represent unexploited rent-seeking opportunities? 
What do BH  mean by  the words “efficient” and “inefficient”? BH define 
efficient firms as those with relatively low average costs and inefficient firms 
as those with relatively high average costs. This is not necessarily X ineffi- 
ciency nor inefficiency in the broad sense of an economy operating inside its 
production possibilities frontier. 
BH’s finding of persistent inefficiencies is a puzzle calling for some expla- 
nation. I suggest four possible explanations of their results: 
1. Rising  marginal  costs.  BH’s  observation, that  unit costs vary  among 
banks, may not be very interesting per se. Supply curves slope upward pre- 
cisely because each increment in output pulls in marginal resources, including 
labor and management, that are less well suited to the purpose than previous 
increments. Persistent cost differences may simply reflect the reality that dif- 
ferent qualities of resources are needed to satisfy the entire market-the  in- 
dustry is operating on the upward sloping portion of the marginal cost curve. 
(This results in producer surpluses for superior firms.) 
Were  inefficiencies to exist,  in the sense that resources outside banking 
could earn more by  leaving their present pursuits and produce banking ser- 
vices, then these resources would, unless restrained by  regulation, move in 
and capture the unexploited rents. But BH do not show that inefficiencies exist 
in this sense. That is, they do not show that unexploited rent-seeking oppor- 
tunities exist in banking. They show only that unit costs,  and profitability, 
differ among banks. 
2. Regulatory barriers to entry. Regulation can protect inefficient firms by 
creating barriers to entry. An Averch-Johnson regulator, for instance, would 
cause firms to overcapitalize.  Like airlines, who before deregulation flew too 
1.  See Averch and Johnson (1962) and Diewert (1981) for an econometric model justifying the 
use of BH-type methods for estimating a variable cost function under Averch-Johnson-type  regu- 
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many planes on too many routes, BH banks might have too much capital so 
that their input mix is suboptimal. This would place them at a point like f  in 
figure 7C. 1  -employing  too much capital. BH empirically test for and reject 
the possibility of the wrong input mix, but they might be wrong about this. 
Bank  regulation, however,  is probably  not  Averch-Johnson,  taking  instead 
some form of branch and geographical restriction.  This could result in many 
banks operating at high  average costs. If  this were true, however,  then BH 
have an econometric problem.  The assumption of cost minimization needed 
for their econometric technique to trace out the unit isoquant would be false. 
Furthermore, BH do not model regulation in order to explain the average cost 
variance nor to justify estimation of a cost function. As far as I know, the only 
econometric model developed for regulated  firms that justifies BH methods 
for estimating a variable average cost curve is by Diewert (1981). 
3.  Capitalization of  land values. Consider two banks that are the same size, 
have the same output mix, use the same technology and input mix, yet bank 
A’s costs, except interest costs, are all larger than bank B’s. Why? A is a New 
York bank, and B is a South Dakota bank. Higher land values in N.Y. have 
become capitalized into all input prices. Tellers cost more; paper products cost 
more; deliveries cost more. Even lunch costs more. Only money, traded in a 
world market, costs the same. Banks A and B are both efficient but average 
costs at bank A, point b in figure 7C. 1, exceeds average costs at bank B, point 
a in figure 7C.1, despite the same input mix. As far as I can tell, BH’s data 
are consistent with this story. Because BH do control in their regressions for 
both rental price and labor cost  variations among banks, they may  already 
have largely captured this effect. Furthermore, they also found substantial cost 
and profit differences among banks in the same large cities. 
4.  Different product mix. Is it possible that bank customers and the services 
they demand differ across banks? Is it further possible that these service dif- 
ferences cannot be detected in data on financial instruments? Perhaps. Depos- 
its are only representations of the actual underlying flow of  services provided 
by banks to deposit customers. 
Consider for example, a $2,000 checking account of two different custom- 
ers in two different banks. The bank A customer may require more labor and 
capital  services than the bank B customer, and this higher level of services 
may impose higher unit costs on bank A than on B. The bank A niche may be 
its appeal to a clientele who differ from bank B clientele. The flow of services 
that accrue to deposit customers are varied,  complex, and subtle-visits  to 
the teller,  withdrawals,  time saved in a complex variety of check and credit 
card transactions,  access to one’s funds at various locations and various peri- 
ods during the week. Larger or smaller variances of holdings may differ across 
customers. All those services associated with deposit accounts accrue to dif- 
ferent customers, who with apparently identical deposit accounts impose dif- 
ferent cost of services on different banks. Security costs, for example, may 283  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
well differ significantly within a given metropolitan region. This would imply 
cost differences but not necessarily differences in deposit accounts. 
Loans, similarly, are only representations of the actual underlying flow of 
services provided by  banks. How much analysis must go into assessing oil 
exploration loans in Texas as opposed to housing loans in Maine or shipping 
loans in Long Beach? Providing credit to Latin American nations may  have 
different costs than a line of  credit to IBM. Pooling risks may  be easier in 
diverse California than in homogeneous Nebraska. Some of these service dif- 
ferences are very difficult, if not impossible, to detect from data on the various 
pieces of paper produced by banks-financial  instruments. BH have only data 
on financial instruments, assets, and liabilities, not data on the ultimate ser- 
vices that flow to customers from these instruments. 
This fourth potential explanation brings me to the core of my comment on 
the state of  knowledge about banking output and productivity growth mea- 
surement. Section 7.1 of the BH paper contains a discussion of the appropriate 
treatment of  bank liabilities. Should deposit accounts be treated as output, 
input, or what? This question is not resolved by  BH  nor by  anyone in the 
literature. Fixler and Zieschang (1991, and chap. 6,  this vol.), for instance, 
have decided to treat deposits as inputs when net financial flows accrue to 
depositors and outputs when net financial flows accrue to banks. As noted BH 
treat deposits as outputs whereas others have treated them as inputs. Some 
components of liabilities are viewed by BH as inputs, such as federal funds 
purchased and large CDs. Interest paid on core deposits are treated as a cost. 
I believe the BH discussion in which they explain differences in approaches, 
like many others, skims over the fundamental questions, and, unless one fo- 
cuses the debate on these fundamental questions, disagreements over how to 
treat deposit accounts and over the key  question concerning the output of 
banking will remain unresolved. It may turn out that BH are absolutely correct 
in their empirical choices, but in my view we need better explicit conceptual 
reasons for our choices. 
To  focus the debate, consider table 7C. 1, which shows five possible as- 
sumptions about  the roles  of  deposits in  the productivity  framework,  ex- 
amples of economists who have assumed each role, and questions that must 
be answered by those making each assumption. Are deposit accounts (liabili- 
ties) only inputs that banks use to produce output on the asset side of  the 
balance sheet? Economics has a long history, traceable to both Karl Marx and 
Adam Smith, doubting the productivity of banks and bankers, so the view that 
banks do not provide productive services, especially to depositors, is wide- 
spread. See, for example, Fixler and Zieschang’s (1991) critique of the United 
Nations system of national accounts. Advocates of  the view that banks pro- 
vide no output to depositors must explain then why people open bank ac- 
counts,  store money  in  the banking  system, write  checks, deposit money, 
withdraw cash, carry bank cards, check guarantee cards, and so forth. This is 284  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
Table 7Cl.  What Are Deposits? Five Possible Assumptions  with References and 
Questions for Each 
Assumption  Reference  Question 




Berger and Humphrey 
(chap. 7) 
Arndt 1984; Triplett (comment 
on chap. 6 and 7); Wykoff 
1991 
Fixler and Zieschang (chap. 
6, this vol.); Hancock 1985; 
Bamett  1980 
Neither  Wykoff (this comment) 
If deposit customers do not receive outputs 
from the banks, then why do they spend 
time and effort to travel to banks to give 
them these free inputs? 
Why are these bank outputs so cheap and 
why have their nominal prices been 
comparatively stable, thus falling even in 
real terms, over the years? 
How do you measure the price of the 
outputs and inputs for purposes of 
partitioning prices and quantities of 
output growth? 
Advocates must answer questions under 
both “outputs” and “inputs,” above, 
because one or the other is assumed for 
each liability at each moment in time. 
output and what are deposits if they are 
neither? 
If deposits are not output, then what is 
a substantial amount of activity to undertake without compensation.  Do they 
do so in order to voluntarily provide input for bankers without receiving com- 
pensating value? If so, how do capitalist bankers force customers to provide 
them with these inputs without charge? Does nothing but trivial yield accrue 
to the depositor? 
BH and many others treat deposits as output. This position,  too, requires 
its supporters to answer a difficult question, If deposits are outputs only, then 
why have the explicit nominal  prices of  these products  been so low and so 
unchanging? Through the volatile period of price level instability from  1965 
to 1981 bank deposit fees and charges were flat. Even throughout deregulation 
under the Decontrol Act of 1981, fees, charges, and rates on deposit accounts 
have been remarkably  low and inflexible.  Even though financial institutions 
are going through difficult times during the 1980s and early 1990s-the  Third 
World loan crisis, bank failures, the oil and real estate collapse, and the sav- 
ings and loan scandals-explicit  charges to customers have not changed very 
much. If deposits are major outputs, then banks are giving away their products 
at very low and very stable nominal prices.  Rate changes have not even ac- 
companied large  fluctuations  in  the  inflation  rate!  Even  the  staunchest  de- 
fender of capitalists do not suggest that they give away their products without 
compensation. BH, in table 7.7 provide a potential answer to this question by 
pointing out that profitability of deposit accounts has declined. This implies 
that banks have been forced by competitiveness  to limit charges on deposit 
accounts. 285  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
Arndt (1984), Triplett (comment on chap. 6 and 7), and I elsewhere (1991) 
have argued that deposits are inputs and outputs  simultaneously.* Banks re- 
ceive valuable inputs, cash, that they use as loans. They are willing to pay for 
their inputs. Depositors, simultaneously, receive outputs from banks that ac- 
crue on the accounts. They would willingly pay for these accounts. However, 
because both the bank  and the depositor receive benefits,  the gains largely 
offset one another and no flow of  payments  from either party  to the other 
occurs. 
Thus we have a very odd kind of  barter transaction  involving  money  in 
which one type of  money  is trade for another. The bank receives an input, 
money, and pays for it with an output, a deposit account. The customer re- 
ceives an output, the deposit account, and pays for it by providing an input, 
money. 
These barter exchanges are not always of  exactly equal value to each party 
in the trade. When the input value exceeds the output value, then added com- 
pensation is demanded by the deposit customer. Thus bank rates on deposits 
exceed any fees and a tiny net cash flow accrues to depositors. When output 
value exceeds input value, the net cash flow in the form of fees and charges 
accrues to banks. Advocates of this approach, too, must resolve a tricky is- 
sue-how  does one measure the gross price of the trade-in-kind exchange? 
All we have data on is those tiny net flows of explicit fees and explicit interest 
charges. 
Fixler and Zieschang, following Hancock (1985) and Barnett (1980) treat 
deposits  as either inputs or outputs depending on the minuscule net flow of 
deposit rates and fees. It seems to me that this view is wrong, even nonsensi- 
cal. They have to answer both sets of  questions raised for the input only and 
output only crowds, When the deposits are outputs, why are they so cheap? 
When they are inputs, why do people provide them to banks? 
My position on this debate requires that I explain what the outputs are and, 
if deposits are not output, then what are they? These are tough questions that 
begin to bring  us  even  deeper toward  the heart of  the matter.  In my  view, 
deposits  are neither  outputs nor inputs. Deposits, in my  view, are financial 
instruments associated  with a flow of a wide variety of  complex and subtle 
services received by deposit customers. Deposits are also intermediate goods 
created  in the bank production  process partly  to provide these services and 
partly to generate other financial instruments that, in turn, generate final prod- 
uct services. 
To determine exactly what these service flows are gets to the very heart of 
an issue not mentioned  so far in discussions of bank  productivity growth- 
2.  Triplett (1990)  provides a cogent explanation and several examples of other barter transac- 
tions that involve trades in kind. 
3. Mamalakis (1987) presents a heuristic discussion of services provided by financial institu- 
tions that focus on, among other things, the time dimension of  loans. This is a valuable point of 
departure toward identifying the different social services provided by banks. 286  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
namely, what do banks  do? As  a service-sector firm, a bank  must  provide 
services.  I  do not  claim to have  fully resolved  exactly  what banks  do nor 
exactly what the services are, but it does seem clear that financial instruments, 
per se, are not services. But what the services are, and how one measures the 
quantities and prices of  these services is not fully resolved in the economics 
literature it~elf.~  Nonetheless, I would like to suggest the direction we should 
look for answers, because I do believe we are closer to the answers than sug- 
gested by the present treatment of banking in the productivity literature. 
In recent years, the comparatively new transactions-cost approach to ana- 
lyzing markets has challenged the standard neoclassical approach that under- 
lies virtually all productivity growth analysis. The central model of neoclas- 
sical theory views competitive market demand and supply schedules as sums 
of separable decisions of producers and consumers who maximize constrained 
objective functions. The transactions-cost approach, based on ideas of Ronald 
Coase in the 1930s and 1940s, focuses on differences among and unique fea- 
tures of various markets that cause these markets to be organized in different 
ways. 
The stock market resembles a Walrasian auction market, but one that must 
be set up by a stock exchange. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, 
reaps a return and other benefits for providing the service of creating the mar- 
ket.  Sunday flea markets  held  in drive-in movie  theaters  resemble Arrow- 
Debreu  barter exchange markets, but here also market organizers receive  a 
return for creating the market. Other markets are organized differently. Steel 
workers negotiate compensation packages. As discussed by Walter Oi (chap. 
4, this vol.), retail store arrangements are very complex. The market for doc- 
tors is set somehow in college chemistry departments,  and as Coase (1988) 
points out those who set up shopping malls bring buyers and sellers together 
and receive significant compensation for this service. 
I would argue that the services provided by banks are better understood  in 
the context of a transactions cost model than a neoclassical model.5 Whereas 
in the neoclassical model firms and markets exist in which trades occur, the 
transactions-costs approach argues that markets must be made. One essential 
function of banks is that they make markets in money. This means they quote 
a price,  absorb imbalances during trading,  assure immediacy, insure traders 
against minor stochastic fluctuations in available supplies and demands, and 
banks do very much more. They operate the payments system. They trans- 
form maturities so as to reconcile the market for loans. They assess risks and 
label customers as worthy of various levels of credit. They provide investment 
advice; manage portfolios; provide safekeeping for funds; insure against theft; 
make trades more convenient, and provide payment services. 
The essence of this wide variety of service activities is inherent character- 
istics of uncertainty, spatial separation, costliness of private information and 
4.  See Santornero (1984) for a summary of modeling efforts of banks as firms. 
5. Goodhart (1989)  contains an excellent discussion of the role of banks and banking as viewed 
in the transactions cost literature as opposed to the Arrow-Debreu approach. 287  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
the costs of time. Until and unless we can model exactly what services banks 
provide and how banks provide these services to facilitate the exchange pro- 
cess in various markets, we are not going to know how to measure the services 
even if we had unlimited access to data. Until we know what the services are, 
we cannot tell statistical agencies what data is missing and what to collect. In 
short, we are, in my judgment, a long way from having viable measures of 
output in banking. 
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Comment  Jack E. Triplett 
I have elsewhere remarked that progress in the measurement of banking has 
been inhibited by two major unresolved questions: (1) What are the outputs? 
Jack  E. Triplett is chief economist of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,  U.S. Department of 
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and (2) What are the inputs? Because these questions correspond  exactly to 
the issues that are displayed in the two papers and discussion in part IIIA of 
this volume, it may be useful first to summarize approaches to banking output 
that are found in the literature.’ Comments on the two papers appear in sec- 
tions 7C.3 and 7C.4. 
7C. 1  The ’kaditional National Accounts Approach 
The oldest measure of banking output is the one contained in the national 
accounts of  most countries. In national accounts, the banking output measure 
is determined largely as a consequence of the treatment of interest flows. Pro- 
duction originating  in a firm (value added) is defined to include net interest 
payments  (interest paid minus interest received),  so that the value added of 
financial firms’ borrowing and lending activities is 
(1)  VA = Ci,D, -  Zr,L,, 
where the first term records the firm’s deposits (or other financial liabilities) 
and interest  rates  paid  and the second loans (or other financial  assets) and 
interest rates received. The result is, obviously, normally negative. 
Because  interest  earnings enter negatively  into  equation (l), the  major 
source of bank revenue (income from lending activity) is excluded definition- 
ally from the measure of banking output. Gorman (1969) colorfully remarks 
that  the  national  accounts  treatment  of  interest  flows-unless  adjusted- 
leaves the “commercial bank . . . portrayed as a leech on the income stream.” 
To avoid a clearly nonsensical  output measure, banks are assumed in na- 
tional  accounts to provide unpriced  or free services  to depositors  (such  as 
check cashing for which no explicit charges are made) that are equal in value 
to the entire net proceeds from banks’ lending  operations. In some formula- 
tions, borrowers are also deemed to receive free services (bookkeeping, credit 
ratings, and the like). In either case, an imputation for banking output takes 
the form: 
where f, and S, are the  implicit  fee and (unobserved)  quantity  of  unpriced 
service  u, and  the other symbols are defined  as in equation  (1). The total 
output  of  the banking industry  includes  the imputed  value of  unpriced  ser- 
vices, as defined in equation (2), plus the value of services for which an ex- 
plicit charge is levied (not only certified checks and so forth-a  very small 
part of bank revenue-but  also in principle the panoply of financial and fidu- 
ciary services that characterize a modem bank). In the United Nations’ (but 
not in the American) implementation, an additional step assures that most of 
banking  output is excluded from GDP and from international  transactions. 
1. This material is condensed from Triplett (1991). 289  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
The national accounts approach to bmking was introduced by Yntema (1947); 
see also United Nations (1968). 
Criticisms  of  the national accounts approach to banking  output are quite 
old. Equation (2) implies that banks act as agents for their depositors (or per- 
haps for both  depositors and borrowers); there is little evidence confirming 
such  a model  of bank  behavior,  or the idea that banks convert their entire 
earnings into unpriced  services.  More fundamental  is criticism of  equation 
(1) and  its exclusion  of  loan revenue from bank  output.  Warburton  (1958) 
asserted that a bank’s sources of revenue (interest earnings from loans) are as 
good an indicator of what banks produce and sell as are the revenues of a coal 
mine or a laundry, and proposed an alternative  services approach that would 
recognize lending activity as the primary bank output. The services approach 
has been  advocated recently by Sunga (1984),  Ruggles (1983),  and others. 
The exclusion of banks’ provision  of  finance to borrowers from the national 
accounts measure of banking output is a serious defect for any analytic pur- 
pose. 
7C.2  The View from the Finance Literature 
Another approach that emphasizes bank deposits occurs in the macroeco- 
nomic  literature of money  and  banking,  and  finance.  In this literature,  the 
major concern is the bank’s role as a portfolio manager, so the banking firm is 
usually modeled as a seller of deposits (Fama 1980; Pesek 1970; Saving 1977; 
and Towey 1974)-which  is equivalent, of course, to depicting banks as sup- 
pliers of  money. The traditional money and banking view of banks even has 
some remote  connection  to the  banking  measurement  used  in  national  ac- 
counts. 
Baltensperger  (1980) and Niehans and Hewson (1976) point out that the 
traditional finance-macro approach, because it concentrates on portfolio man- 
agement, neglects the real side of the economy and also neglects the fact that 
banks  function  as distributors  of  funds.  To  model  banks  as distributors  of 
funds, it is necessary  to think of them as purchasing funds from depositors 
and offering interest and bartered depositor services as payment for the use of 
depositors’ funds. The traditional money and banking paradigm-banks  sell- 
ing liquid securities to depositors-is  not inappropriate for its own purposes, 
but it is unenlightening as a paradigm for analyzing bank production and pro- 
ductivity. 
7C.3  Bank Production Function Approaches 
Models of  real banking  activity and measures of  bank output have been 
developed in the bank regulation literature. To determine whether economies 
of  scale or economies of scope exist in banking, researchers have estimated 
explicit multioutput production or cost functions, where various bank finan- 290  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
cia1 outputs and inputs and the usual capital, labor, and materials inputs are 
specified, Hancock (1991) provides comprehensive references to bank pro- 
duction and cost function studies. 
Though obtaining a valid measure of  output is crucial for modeling bank 
production and costs, a variety of approaches have been followed, and a con- 
sensus on conceptual questions has not yet emerged. 
One approach-inexplicably  known as the production, or sometimes the 
value-added, approach (but better termed the activity approach)-takes  any 
bank activity that absorbs real resources as a bank output. Benston, Hanweck 
and Humphrey (1982) remark, “Output should be measured in terms of what 
banks do that cause operating expenses to be incurred.” In their paper, Allen 
N. Berger and David B. Humphrey follow a modified activity approach. They 
define bank outputs “as those activities which have . . . large expenditures on 
labor and physical capital . . .”; however, they also acknowledge “input char- 
acteristics” of deposits and set up their empirical work to incorporate aspects 
of  deposits as both outputs of banking and as banking inputs. U.S. measures 
of banking labor productivity (Dean and Kunze, chap. 2. this vol.) adopt the 
activity approach-bank  output includes counts of loan and deposit activities 
(such as loan applications processed and checks cleared). 
Critics contend that the cost criterion followed in the activity approach does 
not  adequately serve to distinguish financial inputs from financial outputs. 
Obtaining any financial input incurs some labor and capital costs (processing 
certificates of deposit, e.g.). In the empirical work, however, the bank depos- 
its that are usually identified as outputs under the activity approach are pre- 
cisely the  ones (demand deposits) where depositor compensation contains 
large elements of  bartered services; those bartered services are clearly pro- 
duced by the bank and should be included in any comprehensive measure of 
bank output. 
In a second approach, the researcher distinguishes a priori between those 
banking activities that are properly considered the outputs of a bank and oth- 
ers that are deemed financial inputs. For example, Mester (1987) assumes, of 
savings and loan institutions, that “output is best measured by the dollar value 
of earning assets of the firm, with inputs being labor, capital, and deposits.” 
Three outputs (two types of loans, plus other assets) and three deposit inputs 
(passbook, NOW  accounts, and  certificates) were  specified.  Because only 
bank assets, and not bank liabilities, are specified as outputs, this approach is 
usually termed the asset approach to defining bank output (though sometimes 
it is also referred to as the intermediation approach). Bank deposits are re- 
garded as financial inputs to banks, a necessary source of finance that permits 
them to sell finance to others. 
The asset approach implies that banks buy funds and sell funds, much the 
same as any other specialized merchant. It is equivalent to the services ap- 
proach in the national accounts literature (see sec. 7C.1). 
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is arbitrary. The choices made by some researchers are disputed by others, and 
the approach admits no mechanisms for resolving such debates. As it has usu- 
ally been implemented, the asset approach fails to acknowledge the substan- 
tial bank production of  services that are bartered to depositors as part of  the 
compensation for the use of their funds, a flaw it shares with the parallel ser- 
vices approach in the national accounts literature. 
A third approach resolves the issues empirically. Appealing to  Bamett’s 
(1980) notion of the “user cost of money,” Hancock (1985, 1991) permits any 
particular banking activity to be an input or an output according to the sign of 
its derivative in a bank profit function, which she estimates empirically. In 
Hancock’s findings, loans are bank outputs (which is consistent with  both 
activity and asset approaches-and,  of course, inconsistent with the national- 
accounts approach); time deposits are inputs, but demand deposits are out- 
puts. Fixler and Zieschang follow Hancock’s approach in their paper and ob- 
tain similar empirical results, including the finding that demand deposits are 
bank outputs. 
A major advantage of  the user-cost approach is that it permits statistical 
tests of the hypotheses maintained in other approaches. Note, however, a po- 
tential bias to the empirical results for deposits. Time deposits are typically 
paid for in strictly monetary terms, so the user cost measure is adequately 
represented when the nominal cost of deposits is employed in the estimating 
equation. Demand depositors, on the other hand, receive a large portion of 
their return in unpriced services. Banks’ user costs of  demand deposits are 
accordingly understated when the value of these bartered services is omitted, 
which biases the estimated sign of demand deposits in the profit function.2 
The bias can readily be seen in Hancock’s (1991, 31-32)  expression for the 
real user cost of a particular deposit type, which (slightly simplified) is 
(3)  U, = - 1 + (1 + r, + d, + Rk, - s,)/(l + R), 
where the variables are defined as follows: U, = real user cost per dollar of 
type i deposits; r, = interest rate paid to depositors; d, = deposit insurance 
rate for the type i deposits; R  = discount rate; k, = reserve requirement for 
type  i deposits; and  s, = actual service charges earned on type i  deposits. 
Equation (3) implicitly takes the bank’s acquisition cost for funds to consist 
only of  direct interest payments, r,. For demand deposits, NOW  accounts, 
and similar sources of  funds, nominal interest payments account for only a 
portion of acquisition cost. On conventional checking accounts, for example, 
r, = 0, and the entire bank acquisition cost is made up of  services for which 
no explicit charge is made. The value of these services, or the cost of produc- 
ing them, is omitted from equation (3); if the value of free checks and the like 
were added in to the numerator of  equation (3), the effect must obviously 
2. I  am indebted  to Diana  Hancock for  helpful comments on the  analysis in the following 
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increase the estimated value of U,  , which would make it more likely that de- 
mand deposits would be classified  as financial inputs (for a financial input, 
Nominal  interest  rates  are complete  measures  of  compensation  for pur- 
chased  funds and  are  nearly  complete  for certificates  of  deposit and  other 
simple time deposits. In these cases, the estimate of real user cost is positive, 
because rt is appropriately measured.  These deposits are accordingly  classi- 
fied as financial inputs by Hancock (1985, 1991; and also by Fixler and Zies- 
chang, whose approach is similar). 
If banks adjust service schedules and interest rates on the various accounts 
they offer so as to equalize the cost of funds at the margin, this implies that 
the user cost of  funds from all sources would be equal; this is, of  course, a 
testable hypothesis,  but the hypothesis cannot be tested with data that fail to 
incorporate a major portion (unpriced services) of banks’ acquisition cost of 
certain funds. Adding an imputation for the value of  unpriced depositor ser- 
vices to the nominal cost of demand deposits would correct the bias, and, one 
expects, move the estimates in the direction of making demand deposits finan- 
cial inputs to the bank.3 
The omission of unpriced depositor services from the bank deposit user cost 
measure could also account, in part, for the puzzling sign reversals in Fixler 
and Zieschang’s findings for deposits. The greater is the proportion  of direct 
interest in total depositor compensation, the more likely are demand deposits 
to emerge as bank financial inputs.  Presumably, deregulation of  deposits in- 
creased the proportion of explicit payments in total depositor compensation. 
u, >  0). 
7C.4  Conclusions and Research Directions 
In the three literatures on measuring banking activity summarized  in sec- 
tions 7C. 1-7C.3,  the fundamental difficulty arises in the treatment of demand 
deposits. The underlying cause of the difficulty is the fact that banks compen- 
sate depositors at least in part with bartered services, and data on prices and 
quantities of those bartered services are not available. 
When  deposits  are  treated  as  bank  output  (activity  and  user-cost  ap- 
proaches,  in part),  the logic must be that a count of  the volume of  deposits 
serves as a proxy for unpriced services produced by the bank and provided to 
depositors as compensation for the use of their funds. But by thus obtaining 
an imperfect proxy for the unobserved  portion of bank output, the researcher 
understates a major part of the bank’s cost of funds (though not necessarily 
3. The omission of unpriced services from Barnett’s (1980) formulation of  user costs was noted 
by  Offenbacher (1980, 53,  who wrote:  “Barnett follows the vast  majority of  money  demand 
studies by assuming that it is useful to treat regulated own rates of return [to deposit holders] as 
the true rates. , . . It may be more useful to assume that [interest rates ceilings on bank deposits] 
are almost totally ineffective . . . [and] banks completely evade the ceilings and pay a competitive 
rate of  return on deposits.” Evasion of interest rate ceilings (then set at zero for demand deposits) 
took the form of provision of varying quantities of depositor services. 293  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
understating total bank costs) and distorts cost of funds comparisons between 
banks that use purchased  funds, compared with those that obtain funds from 
traditional deposits. 
When deposits are treated solely as financial inputs, on the other hand (the 
asset approach), the substantial part of bank output made up of unpriced ser- 
vices produced by the bank is omitted. The cost of financial inputs is likewise 
understated by the portion of depositor compensation that takes the form of 
unpriced  services. The same problem arises with respect to the services ap- 
proach in the national accounts literature: it would correct the conceptual in- 
congruity  in the national accounts definition of bank output (its omission of 
loan activity from the output measure) at the cost of excluding unpriced  ser- 
vices that are imputed (if inadequately) in the present measure. 
The national accounts measure of banking contains, of course, an estimate 
of  the value  of  unpriced  depositor  services, but  not  a defensible  one. The 
national accounts estimate of depositor services is clearly too large, because 
it, in effect, assigns the loan rate as the opportunity cost forgone by deposi- 
tor~.~ 
All approaches to banking thus suffer from the absence of data on bartered 
banking transactions.  No approach satisfactorily deals with demand deposits 
in the absence of  such data, and no approach gets around the basic data defi- 
ciency. 
Once the barter nature of banks’ transactions with depositors is recognized, 
then it becomes clear that one must separate conceptually depositor services 
(the bank output) from the deposits themselves, which function as purchased 
financial  inputs  to  the  bank.  The value  of  free  checks,  automatic-teller- 
machine usage, and so forth must be added to banks’ output. Simultaneously, 
the same values must be added to the cost of banks’ purchased financial in- 
puts.  From the depositor’s perspective,  the value of  unpriced  services is si- 
multaneously income and outlay on banking services. 
Obtaining values for unpriced depositor services is a formidable problem. 
It seems natural to view depositor compensation as consisting of  a bundle of 
interest and unpriced  services, much as labor compensation  is made up of 
direct wages plus benefits. One method, applicable in regulated and unregu- 
lated environments alike, is to assume that the full value of the bundle is equal 
for all types of accounts-that  banks equalize at the margin the cost of  funds 
4. Fixler and Zieschang (1991) maintain that, under certain circumstances, the user-cost ap- 
proach they follow can rationalize the idea that banks pay out their earnings to depositors, and this 
seems to offer support for the traditional national accounts treatment of banking. Their demonstra- 
tion is indeed helpful in assessing the plausibility of the agency model of  bank behavior (that is, 
the assumption embodied in eq. [2], sec. 7C. I). However, the essential part of the national ac- 
counts approach to banking is its treatment of loans as negative contributions to bank output, in 
equation (1). This treatment of loans is shared by no other approach to banking (including that of 
Fixler and Zieschang, this vol.). The negative contribution of  loans to equation (1) gives rise to 
the corresponding necessity for inserting a negative sign before the bracketed quantity in equation 
(2). That negative sign in equation (2)-and  not the sensible mathematics that eliminatesit-is 
essential to the logic of the national accounts approach to the output of financial firms. 294  Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey 
from different sources (this implies that deposits are indeed financial inputs to 
the bank), or that depositors value equally at the margin a dollar's  worth of 
interest and a dollar's  worth of unpriced   service^.^  This assumption implies 
that 
(4) 
where  i,  is the interest rate paid on some account with  minimal services (a 
certificate of deposit, perhaps, or purchased funds), i,  is the explicit interest 
(if any) paid on the jth type of account, and (Efu, S,)  designates the quantity 
of unpriced services earned on the  jth account. 
If  alternative  mixes of  interest  and  services are observed  on various  ac- 
counts, which is true under deregulation, a hedonic function (Griliches 1971) 
might be used to estimate the unpriced components of depositor compensation 
(Triplett 1991). This approach is a generalization of  equation (4). It requires 
both  schedules  of  direct  interest  payments  and  of  uncharged  services  (the 
quantity vector S,  in equation (4), which would be used in combination  to 
estimate the implicit price  vectorf",).  Data for implementing  a hedonic ap- 
proach have yet to be assembled, but it is in principle little more difficult than 
any other hedonic investigation. 
Beyond this, the heterogeneity of bank loans has not been addressed satis- 
factorily in empirical estimates. Irrespective of their approach to banking out- 
put, banking  production  function  studies frequently  consider  whether  bank 
output activity is best specified by the count of the numbers of loans (or de- 
posits) of different types, or by their respective monetary volumes. The issue 
arises, of  course, because  loans are not  a homogeneous  commodity:  They 
differ in size and also in other characteristics (riskiness, e.g., or compensating 
balance  requirements). Compensating balance  requirements  imply  that  the 
nominal  quantity  of  loans overstates, and  the  nominal  interest  rate  under- 
states, the true magnitudes of  the loan transaction.  Moreover, because banks 
have extended their financial activities beyond the traditional deposit-taking 
and lending roles, banking output measures must incorporate these nontradi- 
tional activities; some of them (brokerage, selling insurance, executing hedg- 
ing arrangements) are areas where defining or measuring  the output of  the 
activity, or its price, pose conceptual problems comparable in difficulty to the 
ones confronted in traditional banking. 
A perhaps more fundamental question also remains.  When banks  sell fi- 
nance (or rent loanable funds) to borrowers, what is the nature of the services 
that finance provides? The ultimate test for the empirical validity of a measure 
of bank output is to find some effect on, say, the production process and pro- 
5. Presumably it is after tax returns that are equated by depositors. Interest income is taxable; 
implicit unpriced services income is not. In Triplett (1991) I argued that the relevant bank marginal 
cost might differ from the direct cost of producing services if the method of depositor compensa- 
tion affects the costs of reserves. Neither of these complications needs to be considered here. 295  Measurement and Efficiency in Banking 
ductivity of  business borrowers, for whom banking output is an intermediate 
input. 
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COmI’IleIlt  Diana Hancock 
There are several issues that must be resolved before the existing literature on 
output aggregation  can be  applied to banking.  Of primary  importance is a 
methodology for classifying and measuring financial services. Although it is 
agreed  that  banking  firms  produce  heterogeneous  services,  there  has  been 
little consensus on the measurement of their outputs and inputs. The outputs 
used by  various researchers  include total  assets, earning assets,  loans, total 
deposits, produced deposits,  demand deposits in dollar terms, the number of 
deposit and loan accounts, gross operating income, and combinations of these 
measures. 
The central questions in what can be termed “the classification  problem” 
are (1) Which balance sheet items produce services that are net outputs, and 
which ones are net inputs? In particular, are demand deposit services net out- 
puts, or are these services intermediate inputs? and (2) How does one measure 
the outputs and inputs,  or put prices on them? The measurement  of  price is 
dual to the question, What units is output measured in? One can be obtained 
from the other if the necessary conditions for producer equilibrium are satis- 
fied. Another way of  posing the problem is whether stock or flow variables 
measure the relevant concept of bank output and input. 
Even  with  appropriate  prices  and quantities  for financial  services deter- 
mined, the following topics need to be addressed before exact aggregate out- 
put indexes for banking can be constructed.  First, tests for whether the nec- 
essary  separability  restrictions  hold  to  construct  each  output  subaggregate 
need  to  be  performed.’ Second, if  all prices  move  proportionately,  then  a 
Hicksian  aggregation  scheme can be used to aggregate over the firm’s joint 
output supplies. This proportionality assumption is unlikely to hold for finan- 
cial service prices, due in part to regulation, and hence aggregation over out- 
Diana Hancock is an economist in the Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors of the 
1. A subaggregate refers to an index containing fewer than all the prices or quantities used in 
Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 
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puts is possible only if outputs are separable from inputs in the financial firm’s 
technology.2 Third,  the  functional  form  for  the  aggregator  function,  and 
whether it is linear homogeneous, determines the appropriate nonparametric 
approximation,  or index number,  which corresponds to the economic output 
quantity index in banking. 
The papers by Dennis J. Fixler and Kimberly D. Zieschang and Allen N. 
Berger and David B. Humphrey both use nonparametric approaches to clas- 
sify financial services as inputs or outputs. Fixler and Zieschang employ the 
user-cost approach to determine whether a balance sheet item is a net output 
of a bank. In contrast, Berger and Humphrey use a value-added approach. 
The user-cost approach tackles the classification problem by deriving com- 
plete rental prices for each balance-sheet item. The user cost of  a financial 
service, or price, is the net effective cost per dollar of holding the asset or 
liability on the balance sheet over period t.  These prices depend on the oppor- 
tunity cost of  capital as well as interest rates, capital gains, reserve require- 
ments,  and insurance premiums. In continuous time, the user cost for each 
asset is the difference between the bank’s opportunity cost of  capital and its 
holding revenue rate. If  the holding revenue is not sufficient to cover the op- 
portunity cost of capital, then the balance-sheet item contributes to the finan- 
cial institution’s costs, and the financial product  is a net input. If, however, 
holding  revenues  are greater than  the opportunity  cost of  capital,  then  the 
firm’s production of this service contributes to revenue,  and the service is a 
financial output. The user cost for each liability incorporates the implicit rev- 
enue from deposit balances and takes into account reserve  requirement^.^ If 
holding costs are greater than the opportunity cost of capital, then holding the 
liability on the balance sheet contributes to costs, and the liability is classified 
as an input. 
Estimation of the opportunity cost of capital is important because it influ- 
ences the prices, the classification of inputs and outputs, and hence the reve- 
nues and cost earned from the production of  financial services. The paper by 
Fixler and Zieschang obtains an estimator for the opportunity cost of capital 
that comes from the specification of the technology producing intermediation 
2.  See William Bamett, The Microeconomic Theory of Monetary Aggregation, in New Ap- 
proaches to Munetary Economics,  ed. William Bamett and Kenneth Singleton (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge Univ. Press, 1987). 124, for a discussion of  this problem in the context of  money aggre- 
gation. 
3. Berger and Humphrey  calculate the implicit revenues from deposit balance j  as implicit 
revenue = (1 -  rl/rflj  [DB,  (1 -  k,)]r,,;  where r, is the average interest rate paid on depositj, rf 
is a market rate  such as the federal funds rate, DB, is the dollar balance of deposit j,  k, is the 
reserve requirement rate, and r,,  is the 90-day Treasury Bill rate. Rearranging terms the implicit 
revenue per dollar of deposit balance j is (rr, -  k,rTa -  rl(rrJrflj  + k,rJrTJrJ). These implicit 
revenues are included in the user cost calculation with the assumption that the appropriate oppor- 
tunity cost of capital is both the 90-day Treasury Bill rate and a proxy for the market rate. See 
Diana Hancock, The Financial Firm: Production with Monetary and Nonmonetary Goods, Jour- 
nal  of Political Economy 93(1985j: 859-80  for a derivation of  user cost formulas for asset and 
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services, and the assumption of  profit maximizing behavior. The authors as- 
sume that the value of the opportunity cost of capital for each bank is equal to 
some proportion of its return on assets, and this proportion is the same for all 
banks. By  adopting this approach, when the industry representative opportu- 
nity cost of  capital is estimated, a distribution of  bank-specific opportunity 
costs is also obtained because each bank has a different return on  By 
developing a theoretically appropriate opportunity cost of capital for banking, 
the authors have helped to answer the question of how inputs and outputs for 
financial services are classified using the user-cost approach.s 
Fixler and Zieschang estimate a linear homogeneous conditional distance 
function to obtain an estimator for the opportunity cost of capital. A Malm- 
quist economic output index is the ratio of  this conditional distance function 
for two time periods. The assumption of the linear homogeneity is important 
because otherwise the output quantity aggregate depends on the choice of the 
reference quantity used to condition the distance function.6  The translog spec- 
ification for the distance function used in their paper can produce a second- 
order approximation to any distance function. An  appropriate nonparametric 
approximation to the Malmquist quantity index is the Tornqvist Divisia in- 
dex.’ This index is chained, and measures changes relative to the previous 
period rather than a base period. It remains suitable even when the technology 
is changing over time, and the aggregator function is shifting. This feature is 
crucial in the measurement of banking output in the 1980s. Berger and Hum- 
phrey state, “The shift over time in the thick frontier cost function, after ad- 
justment for changes in market factors and aggregate interest rates, shows 
important changes in both operating and interest costs resulting from deregu- 
lation.” Hence, a useful measure of aggregate bank output needs to be flexible 
enough to allow financial institutions to respond to their external environment 
and technological changes over time. An extension of  this approach is to test 
whether separability conditions for output subaggregates hold. It may be pos- 
sible to construct aggregates which only use financial service data. 
The value-added approach assumes that the firm’s technology can be writ- 
ten, 
4.  The different returns on assets reflect differences in risk, liquidity, and duration across insti- 
tutions that affect their opportunity cost of capital. 
5.  Market proxies, such as the 90-day Treasury Bill rate, are provided for the opportunity cost 
of capital. 
6. Fixler and Zieschang use the level of deposits as the reference quantity in their estimation of 
the technology for banking firms. Quality variables are incorporated in the conditional distance 
function, too. 
7.  W.  E. Diewert,  Exact and Superlative Index Numbers, Journal of Econometrics 4(1976): 
115-45,  has shown that the discrete Divisia index is exact for the Malmquist quantity index even 
if the distance function is a nonhomogeneous translog if  the reference level is chosen appro- 
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where Q, is  an  exact output aggregate for period t, and the firm’s input 
vector has been partitioned such that x,, is the vector of quantities of primary 
input (such as labor and capital) and x2,  is a vector of intermediate inputs. The 
factor  price  vector  is  partitioned  in  a  corresponding manner  with  w,  = 
(wl,,  w2).  The  firm’s  variable  profit  function conditional on  xi,  is n,  = 
n(xir,  wz,.  p,), where p, is the output price vector. The true index of real value 
added is 
which depends on the reference prices w;,  p* . 
is separable so that 
The need to select the reference prices become unnecessary if and only if g 
In this case nr = ni(x,,)n2(w2,  p) and n,orl  = ni(xl,o>/ni(x,,i).  If  + has a 
translog functional form, then a discrete Divisia index is exact for nrori.  In 
continuous time, the Divisia index is always exact for +(xl), which is value 
added. 
Berger and Humphrey extend the value-added approach to classify financial 
services as inputs or outputs. The primary input costs,  salaries and fringe 
benefits, occupancy, furniture and equipment expenses are allocated ex ante 
to specific balance-sheet items such as real estate loans, and demand deposits 
using an external source of operating cost allocations.8 Outputs are defined as 
those services that are responsible for the largest amount of operating costs. 
This approach assumes that the firm’s technology can be written 
(4)  Q,  = h(xIi,,  . . .  x,~,~x~), 
where the primary input vector x,,  has been partitioned into n separate banking 
functions. Value added is calculated for each financial service, and the index 
of real value added is 
8. Berger and Humphrey use functional cost analysis data. This is a cost accounting system, 
developed by the Federal Reserve, that assigns direct and joint costs to specific banking functions, 
such as demand deposits. This system is based on expert information, participant surveys, and 
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Underlying  this  representation  of  the technology is the assumption that the 
transformation  function  is nonjoint  in  inputs,  or that there exist individual 
subproduction functions for each financial servi~e.~ 
Tests need  to be performed  using banking data to determine whether  the 
necessary separability conditions hold to construct either a general true index 
of value added, or an index of product specific value added for banking. The 
latter index would require additional testing on the structure of the technology 
for the banking firm. The resulting economic quantity aggregates can be ap- 
proximated using index number theory. 
Berger and Humphrey investigate technical change, or shifts in the produc- 
tion  technology  for banking  output over  time.  Shifts in  the  minimum-cost 
technology  are distinguished  from changes in  the dispersion  of  bank  costs 
away from the minimum technology. The dispersion is decomposed into inef- 
ficiency components and market factor components. They find that, if ineffi- 
ciency  is not taken  account of, then  measures of  technical  change may  be 
biased in periods of disequilibrium.'0  This result is important because it indi- 
cates that measurement of technical progress requires estimation of the firm's 
technology. The rate of technological change may not be able to be measured 
exactly in banking using input and output indexes. 
In conclusion,  the literature on aggregation and index number theory can 
be used to construct economic measures of banking output. Examination of 
the production technology is essential to test whether the necessary separabil- 
ity conditions hold, if jointness in production is statistically important, and to 
study technical change and productivity. This examination may also help de- 
termine whether deposit services are intermediate inputs or outputs. 
9.  Berger and Humphrey do not impose this structure on their estimating system once outputs 
and inputs have been classified using the value-added approach. Z. T. Adar, T. Agmon, and Y.  E. 
Orgler, Output Mix and Jointness in Production in the Banking Firm, Journal of  Money, Credit, 
and Bunking 7( 1975):  235-43,  argue that interdependence may arise from the joint use of certain 
inputs by many banking products. Jointness in production is evident in the joint use of information 
by different departments. An example is the use of depositor information when evaluating a loan 
application. Jointness in production, also called economies of scope, has been found to be statis- 
tically significant in some but not all studies of financial service production. 
10. Berger and Humphrey argue that much of the disequilibrium in the 1980s was caused by 
deregulation, and the less than cost-minimizing response to it by banks. 